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decision-supporttools--andpositions it within one of the most enduring debates at
the intersection of administrative law and tort law. The Article identifies key
factors that policy-makers in medical, environmental, and other contexts use to
decide between regulatory and tort approaches to public protection, and argues
that ex ante regulation may be insufficient to guarantee the quality of decisionsupport tools in the absence of a complementary tort remedy. The Article
concludes by identifying the steps that would need to be taken to establish a system
of ex post tort liability for creators of faulty decision aids and explaining the
challenges associatedwith such a move.
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INTRODUCTION
After scheduling a routine checkup with a new general practitioner, John,
age 55, received confirmation of the appointment by mail. The letter from the
doctor's office suggested that John consider the possibility of having his prostatespecific antigen ("PSA") levels tested and asked that he read an enclosed booklet
entitled "Prostate Cancer and You," published by the Association for Patient
Advocacy and Education ("APAE"), for more information.' John was surprised at
this request, because his previous physician had a policy of routinely ordering PSA
tests for all men over 50 without question.2

1.
The APAE is a fictional organization, as is the "Prostate Cancer and You"
booklet. The materials that form the basis of this case study have been compiled from actual
decision-support tools for prostate cancer screening and treatment published by a variety of
public and private organizations, which are cited throughout this Article.
2.

See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,

PROSTATE CANCER

SCREENING: A DECISION GUIDE 11, available at http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/prostate/pdf

prosguide.pdf ("Medical experts who encourage regular screening . .. recommend that all
men who have a life expectancy of at least 10 years should be offered the PSA test and DRE
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John opened the booklet and began to read:
If you are concerned about prostate cancer, you may already
know about PSA (prostate-specificantigen) testing. There may be
benefits and risks to PSA testing. However, research has not yet
proven that the benefits of testing outweigh the risks. This booklet
will help you decide whether testing is rightfor you.4

Additional information followed:
PSA screening tests the level of PSA in your bloodstream. PSA
values belowfour (4) are considerednormal. PSA values abovefour
(4) are associated with, but cannot diagnose, prostate cancer. Only
a biopsy can confirm the presence or absence of cancer.
Approximately 10-15% of men screenedfor PSA will have levels
above four (4).'
Biopsies reveal that only 30% of men with elevated PSA levels
actually have prostate cancer; the remaining 70% are 'false
positives.'

annually beginning at age 50."); Daniel Merenstein, Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15, 15
(2004) (noting testimony of four medical experts that customary practice is to "have no

discussion with the patient about prostate cancer screening [and] simply do the test");
Shannon Brownlee & Jeanne Lenzer, Do I Have Cancer?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 2011, at
MM40 ("Today it's common for doctors to order the P.S.A. test and patients to take it
without talking about what it might really mean.").
3.
The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force's 2012 recommendation on PSA
screening concluded that there is no evidence of benefit from regular PSA testing and that
the risks of harm resulting from biopsies and preventive treatment exceed the benefits of
testing. Prostate Cancer Final Recommendation Statement, U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK
FORCE (May 2012), http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/prostatecancerscreening/
prostatefinalrs.htm. The Task Force ultimately recommended against routine PSA screening
for prostate cancer. Id

4.

Similar language is used in many publicly available decision aids. See, e.g.,

AM. CANCER Soc'Y, TESTING FOR PROSTATE CANCER (2010), available at http://www.

cancer.org/downloads/PRO/TestingProstate.pdf, HEALTH DIALOG, IS A PSA TEST RIGHT
FOR YOU? (2010), available at https://www.healthcrossroads.com/content/la6532e8-f5454b72-bd5a-850493b9adla/c254bc46-a52c-4cO2-9elb-cl624c016al5/PSAOO 1B_v04.pdf
5.
See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 10 (noting
that 85% of men over age 50 will have normal PSA test results); HEALTH DIALOG, supra
note 4, at 10 ("About 8 out of 100 men who have PSA tests have an abnormal result. . . .").
6.
See AM. CANCER Soc'v, supra note 4, at 10 (30% men with elevated PSA
have prostate cancer); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 10
(20% men with elevated PSA have prostate cancer); HEALTH DIALOG, supra note 4, at 10
(37.5% of men with elevated PSA are diagnosed with cancer after biopsy); Informed Health
Choice, PROSDEX: A PSA Decision Aid, PROSDEX, http://www.prosdex.com/index_
content.htm (last visited June 30, 2012) (approximately 33% of men with a raised PSA level
will have prostate cancer); Alex Krist, The PSA, Prostate Cancer and You, VCU DEP'T OF
FAM. MED., http://www.familymedicine.vcu.edu/research/misc/psa/index.html (last visited
June 30, 2010) (citing the rate of false positives at about 70%).
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* Biopsies reveal that very few men with normal PSA levels
actually have prostatecancer ('false negatives").'

The booklet emphasized that prostate cancer is usually slow-growing;
often, it causes no symptoms.8 Most men with prostate cancer-85% or more by
some estimates-live long lives and die of unrelated causes.9 in contrast, the
majority of men who do get treatment for prostate cancer (prostatectomy or
radiology) report significant side effects, including incontinence and impotence.' 0
The booklet concluded with three patient testimonials-one from a man
who was tested for PSA, found that his levels were normal, and felt peace of
mind;" one from a man who was tested for PSA, discovered that his levels were
high, and pursued aggressive early treatment;' 2 and one from a man who decided
not to get tested for PSA. The third man was quoted as saying:
I worry about prostate cancer, but I don't want to have any
unnecessary procedures. Given how few men actually die of

See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 10
7.
(85% men have normal PSA levels, "though a small number of these men will have a cancer
that was missed by the PSA test."); Krist, supra note 6 (1-2% false negatives); Informed
Health Choice, supra note 6 ("A normal PSA level suggests that probably, but not
definitely, you do not have prostate cancer.").
AM. CANCER SOC'Y, supra note 4, at 4; Informed Health Choice, supra note
8.

6.
9.
The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force's draft recommendation on PSA
screening reported that 95% of men with PSA-detected cancer do not die of the cancer
within 12 years, even in the absence of treatment. Draft Recommendation Statement, U.S.
PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE (Oct. 11, 2011), www.uspreventiveservices
taskforce.org/uspstfl2/prostate/draftrecprostate.htm. This fact, however, was not included in
the Task Force's final recommendation. Prostate Cancer FinalRecommendation Statement,
supra note 3. See also Krist, supra note 6 ("In 2007, only 27,050 Americans died from
prostate cancer, compared to 218,890 men diagnosed with the disease.").
Brownlee & Lenzer, supra note 2 ("About half of men who undergo
10.
radiation or surgery will have permanent side effects like impotence and incontinence. Up
to I in 200 men die within 30 days from complications related to the surgery."); Krist, supra
note 6 (explaining that up to 63% of men treated for prostate cancer experience problems
with sexual function, and 42% with urination).
AM. CANCER SOC'Y, supra note 4, at 15 ("1 will have peace of mind when I
11.
know the test results."); see also Eila Watson et al., Informed Decision Making andProstate
Specific Antigen (PSA) Testing for Prostate Cancer, 63 PATIENT ED. & COUNSELING 367,
372 tbl.2 (2006) (between 59.7% and 74% of men "strongly agree" with the statement,
"[h]aving a PSA test would give me peace of mind.").
12.

See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 13 ("I

will take the screening tests because they will give me peace of mind. It could mean finding
a problem, taking further tests, and treating a potentially serious prostate cancer. And since
there's no way to tell if the prostate cancer will cause problems in the future, I want it found
early when treatments might be more effective.").
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prostate cancer, andgiven the signficant side effects of treatment, I
3
don't want PSA testing. I'd rather take a wait-and-see approach.1

The booklet concluded:
You have been given a lot of information. Be sure to talk to
your doctor.1

When John visits his general practitioner the following week, the doctor
reiterates the general risks and benefits of PSA screening and asks John whether he
has any additional questions. John asks to be screened for PSA, explaining that
although he does not want to suffer through unnecessary treatments, he would like
to have a more realistic sense of his chances of having prostate cancer. If his PSA
levels are normal, John thinks, he can take comfort in the fact that his chances of
actually having prostate cancer are, according to the booklet, very small.' 5
In fact, John's PSA test results are just as he had hoped-they are below
four, which the doctor informs him is normal for a man of his age. Based on this
result, John tells his doctor that he does not want to be tested for PSA again until
he reaches the age of 60. The doctor, satisfied that John has made a decision based
on the best available evidence, agrees to this plan.
Three years later, John begins to experience pain and bleeding while
urinating. He visits a urologist, who conducts a digital rectal exam and finds a
large tumor in John's prostate. A biopsy reveals that John has an advanced stage of
prostate cancer. Based on the size of the tumor and the severity of John's
symptoms, the urologist estimates that John's chances of five-year survival are
very low. He suggests that John consider radiation or surgery but cautions that
these procedures may not be successful at this late stage.
John does everything he can to educate himself about prostate cancer and
available treatments. He first consults the booklet his general practitioner had
given him three years ago; he then looks for other sources of information. In an
article in Men's Health, John learns about research (available at the time of his
PSA test) establishing that up to 30% of normal PSA tests may be false
negatives.' 6 In John's view, this seems to conflict with the booklet's description of
13.

Id. ("I will not take the screening tests until medical experts agree that

finding and treating prostate cancer in its early stages reduce the chance of dying from it.
Screening tests could lead to further tests and treatment of a prostate cancer that may never
cause problems. And treatment can have serious side effects."); HEALTH DIALOG, supra note

4, at 18 ("I'd rather take the watchful waiting approach until my physician recommends
otherwise and not suffer the problems that have occurred with other men that I have talked
to ... with impotence and incontinence.").
See, e.g., AM. CANCER Soc'v, supra note 4, at 17 ("Starting at age 50, talk to
14.
your doctor about the pros and cons of testing. Then decide if testing is the right choice for
you."); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 17 ("To decide
whether screening is right for you, discuss the pros and cons of screening with your doctor

and the people important in your life.").
See supranote 7.
See AM. CANCER Soc'Y, supra note 4, at 10 (15% of men with PSA levels
below four are diagnosed with prostate cancer after biopsy); HEALTH DIALOG, supra note 4,
15.

16.
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the number of men with false negatives as "very few." The article also notes that
the false positive rate is much lower than the 70% cited in the booklet: a report by
the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force found that false positives occur in only
17
12-13% of men randomly assigned to PSA-based screening. Had John known
this information at the time of his PSA test-that the likelihood of false negatives
is higher than represented to him and that the number of false positives is fewerhe would have certainly asked his doctor for regular annual screenings, rather than
delaying his next test for five years.
John also learns that nearly 90% of men with elevated PSA test results
ultimately go on to have radiation or surgery.' 8 Had his later test results been
abnormal, John thinks, he would have sought treatment as well. According to his
urologist, if John's prostate cancer had been caught at an earlier stage, it would
have significantly increased his chances of survival.

The above scenario is just one example of the problems that can arise
when the informed consent process incorporates information provided by someone
other than the patient's treating physician. This happens more frequently in
modem medical care as more physicians and patients adopt the emerging model of
shared decision-making ("SDM"). SDM, which encourages patients to consult
brochures, videos, or computer programs ("decision aids" or "decision-support
tools") before making decisions about preference-sensitive care, has been touted as
an important and valuable supplement to the traditional process of informed
consent.' 9 Indeed, decision aids targeted to patient needs appear to be more
effective than standardized informed consent documents in achieving patient
comprehension, recall, and satisfaction.
Unlike the traditional informed consent process, which is highly regulated
and governed by decades of common law, the creation and use of decision -support
tools is currently controlled only by market forces. No administrative regulations
exist to delineate the appropriate scope of decision aids, and no tort remedy is
available to patients who are injured by faulty decision aids. The only move
at 11 (same); William J. Catalona, Clinical Utility of Measurements Free and Total
Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA): A Review, 29 PROSTATE 64, 64 (1996) (finding a 20%
false negative rate); Evelyn C. Y. Chan et al., Do Men Know That They Have Had a
Prostate-SpecificAntigen Test?: Accuracy of Self-Reports of Testing at 2 Sites, 94 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH

1336, 1337 (Aug. 2004) (finding false negative rate of 33-36%).

Roger Chou et al., Screeningfor Prostate Cancer: A Review of the Evidence
17.
for the US. Preventive Services Task Force, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 762, 762 (2011).
Prostate Cancer Final Recommendation Statement, supra note 3 ("[N]early
18.

90% of men with PSA-detected prostate cancer undergo early treatment with surgery,
radiation, or androgen deprivation therapy."); see also Brownlee & Lenzer, supra note 2
("For many people, not being treated after a diagnosis of cancer is psychologically
unbearable.").
See infra Part I.
19.
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toward a legal mechanism for control of decision aids is a modest proposal in the
2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA") for the creation of an
entity to certify decision aids used as part of SDM. Creators of decision aidssome of which are for-profit corporations-have little incentive to maintain the
integrity of their products other than market pressures to maintain good business
practices. In other contexts, such as environmental regulation, products liability,
and pharmaceuticals, it has become clear that market pressures are often
insufficient to protect consumers.20
This Article asks whether a regulatory proposal like the one in the
PPACA is sufficient to ensure the quality of decision-support tools and to protect
patients. To answer this question, this Article engages in the long-standing debate
about the use of regulatory versus tort mechanisms to control industry behavior. 2'
In some circumstances, standard-setting administrative regulations may be
sufficient to protect consumers from harm while at the same time supporting the
growth of valuable industries. In other circumstances, policy-makers find that
regulations need to be complemented by a tort regime that fills the compensation
gap when consumers suffer injury. The discussion among policy-makers and legal
scholars about which system to favor is continually playing out in a variety of
arenas-among them environmental regulation, product design, vaccines, drugs
and, medical devices. Indeed, two recent Supreme Court decisions analyzing the
preemptive effect of regulation in the pharmaceutical and medical-device
industries have directly addressed this critical issue.22
The scholarly conversation about regulatory and tort law approaches to
improving quality has always been active. This Article, however, makes a
significant contribution in synthesizing the available thinking on this topic and
identifying a set of five concrete characteristics that help policy-makers when
choosing between a regulatory and tort regime. These characteristics include the
regulatory regime's ability to satisfy compensatory and information-gathering
goals, the nature of the injury to be prevented, the comprehensiveness and
precision of the regulation, and the difficulty of proving causation. While there has
been little consistency in how courts and policy-makers have applied these
characteristics in their analyses of controversial cases, scholars of administrative
and tort law have long recognized the salience of each of these characteristics to
the resolution of these debates.

See Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52
20.
L. REv. 1093, 1120-21, 1126 (1993).
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive
21.
Theory, 16 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 205 (2008); Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When
Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. art. 4 (2006); Robert L. Rabin,
Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a
Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and
ContemporaryRisks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65 (1989).
MD.

22.

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.

555 (2009).
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This Article demonstrates that decision-support tools, although essential
to improving an informed consent process widely viewed as flawed, possess
characteristics associated with a significant risk of patient harm; therefore,
decision-support tools, and the information they provide, would benefit from the
development of a set of controlling legal mechanisms. One option would be to rely
exclusively on a regulatory regime, such as the one proposed in PPACA. An
alternative would be to supplement administrative regulation with a
complementary compensatory remedy grounded in tort law. To decide between
these two options, this Article applies the five factors described in Part IV to the
context of patient decision aids, and concludes that although the proposed
regulatory mechanisms are an important first step in ensuring decision-aid quality,
they will likely be insufficient to protect consumers from harm when implemented
on their own. Rather, much like the contexts of vaccines and pharmaceuticals,
patient decision aids are best suited to a robust regulatory regime supplemented by
a complementary tort remedy for injured patients. The Article concludes by
identifying the steps that would need to be taken to establish a system of ex post
tort liability for creators of faulty decision aids and explains the challenges
associated with such a move.

I. HISTORY OF DECISION-SUPPORT TOOLS
The average American patient no longer relies exclusively on her
physician to obtain health information. Modem patients have a variety of tools at
their disposal, including informational websites such as those provided by the
Mayo Clinic 23 and the National Institute of Health ("NIH"); 24 patient networking
sites like e-patients.net; direct advertising by pharmaceutical companies; state and
federal public health campaigns; targeted mailings by insurance plans; and
recommendations from professional associations. Patients often consult these
resources on their own, or with the encouragement of their healthcare providers, to
learn more about care and treatment options than they could during the typical
doctor's appointment.
This Article focuses on an increasingly important category of patient
health information-physician-mediated decision-support tools that are provided
by third parties and often used by the patient outside the clinical context. These
decision aids can come in the form of brochures, videos, computer programs, or
third-party consultations, and are largely unregulated.25 Their integration as part of
contemporary informed consent practice plays directly into the debate about the
relative merits of regulatory and tort enforcement mechanisms.

23.
24.

MAYO CLINIC,

http://www.mayoclinic.com/ (last visited July 1, 2012).

Health Information, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://health.nih.gov/ (last

visited July 1, 2012).
See Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent Beyond the Physician-Patient
25.
Encounter: Tort Law Implications of Extra-ClinicalDecision Support Tools, 21 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 1, 9-10 (ASLME Special Ed. 2012).
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While patient educational materials created by state departments of public
health are part of the history of American public health,26 the increased
prominence of the SDM movement is shining new light on patient decision aids,
which are an integral part of SDM. The SDM movement developed over the past
30 years as a response to growing disenchantment among the medical and patient
27
communities with existing informed consent practices.
A vast body of evidence demonstrates that the process of informed
consent as currently practiced has failed to live up to its goals.2 8 Studies show that
physicians "often fail to disclose even major side effects of treatment;"29 that
informed consent forms are far too technical, failing to take into account varying
degrees of health literacy; 30 that the informed consent process often does not
improve patient understanding of critical aspects of treatment; ' and that many
patients are unable to accurately recall information provided during informed
consent.32 One study, evaluating 540 informed consent forms currently used by
157 hospitals, concluded that the forms "provide little substantive content to help
26.
216 (1990);

JOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH
GEORGEROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 369 (1993).

27.
See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent:
The Casefor Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 459-63 (2006);
Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 904 (1993).

28.
As early as 1982, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research found "enormous
variation ... in the decision-making process" in various settings and concluded that it was
"rare" for the idealized vision of informed consent to be realized in practice. 1 PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 10

(1982), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/past-commissions/
making health caredecisions.pdf; see also Melissa M. Bottrell et al., Hospital Informed
Consent for Procedure Forms: FacilitatingQuality Patient-PhysicianInteraction, 135
26, 26-27 (2000); C. Lavelle-Jones et al., FactorsAffecting Quality of

ARCHIVES SURGERY

Informed Consent, 306 BMJ 885, 885 (1993); Danielle M. McCarthy et al., What Did the
Doctor Say? Health Literacy and Recall of Medical Instructions, 50

(2012).
29.

MED. CARE

277, 277

Bottrell et al., supra note 28, at 26.

30.
See id. at 30; Savyasachi C. Thakkar et al., Accuracy, Legibility, and Content
of Consent Forms for Hip Fracture Repair in a Teaching Hospital, 6 J. PATIENT SAFETY

153, 156 (2010).
31.
See Bottrell et al., supra note 28, at 30; Eric S. Holmboe et al., Perceptions
of Benefit and Risk of Patients Undergoing First-Time Elective Percutaneous Coronary
Revascularization, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 632, 632 (2000) (only 46% of patients were

able to identify a possible complication the day prior to undergoing their procedure).
32.
See Bottrell et al., supra note 28, at 27, 30; Mayer Brezis et al., Quality of
Informed Consentfor Invasive Procedures, 20 INT'L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 352, 352

(2008); Lavelle-Jones et al., supra note 28, at 888 (noting that only between 14% and 66%
of patients are "able to recall basic details of their surgery" after engaging in the informed
consent process); McCarthy et al., supra note 28, at 277 (highlighting that despite adequate
health literacy, fewer than 30% of patients recognized pain and fever as signs of infection
even after the informed consent process).
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patients make decisions, or even meet basic standards for informed consent."33 It
found that 12.9% of forms failed to mention general risks of treatment and 54.1%
failed to mention serious risks. Moreover, more than 80% of forms failed to
identify specific treatment alternatives or discuss the consequences of choosing not
to be treated.34 Another study, tracking 265 surgical patients at a large teaching
hospital, found that 69% of patients "admitted to not reading the consent form
before signing it."35 A third study found that fewer than 10% of patients were able
to restate what they were told during the informed consent process. 36 Finally,
another long-standing criticism of modern informed consent practice is that its
purpose seems to be more to protect healthcare providers and institutions from
liability than to truly inform patients.37
The SDM movement has been proposed as a substantial improvement on
existing informed consent practices. Spurred in part by Jack Wennberg's
influential research on practice variations in preference-sensitive care," SDM
seeks to assist patients in choosing among medical interventions when clinical
evidence alone does not identify a favored option (also known as "preferencesensitive care"). The SDM model has been touted as potentially improving patient
satisfaction,
clinical outcomes,40 cost of care,4
and physician time

33.
Bottrell et al., supra note 28, at 30.
34.
Id.at 29 tbl.1.
35.
Lavelle-Jones et al., supra note 28.
Brezis et al., supra note 32.
36.
37.
See, e.g., Bottrell et al., supra note 28, at 30 (noting that the "legal
appearance" of informed consent forms may explain "why patients believe forms were
created to protect hospitals or physicians.").
38.
See generally JOHN E. WENNBERG, TRACKING MEDICINE: A RESEARCHER'S
QUEST TO UNDERSTAND HEALTH CARE (2010).
39.
See, e.g., King & Moulton, supra note 27, at 468-69; Annette M. O'Connor
et al., Modifying Unwarranted Variations in Health Care: Shared Decision Making Using
PatientDecisionAids, HEALTH AFF., 63, 65-66 (2004); Edward H. Wagner et al., The Effect
of a SharedDecisionmakingProgramon Rates of Surgeryfor Benign ProstaticHyperplasia
PilotResults, 33 MED. CARE 765, 770 (1995).
40.
See, e.g., BARBARA L. MCANENY, REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON MED. SERV.,

CMS REPORT 7-A-10: SHARED DECISION-MAKING 4 (2010) [hereinafter CMS REPORT],
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/cms/al0-cms-rpt-7.pdf; King &
Moulton, supra note 27, at 469-70; Jaime S. King et al., The Potentialof SharedDecision
Making to Reduce Health Disparities,39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 30, 31 (2011).
41.
See, e.g., CMS REPORT, supra note 40, at 1 (noting that the use of decision-

making tools may "help increase the value of health care spending in the United States,
while also maximizing clinical quality."); Sandy Leitch, Chairman's Statement, in BUPA
ANNUAL REPORT 2010 at 3, 3, availab!e at http://www.bupa.com/media/42158/
bupa ar br chairman.pdf ("In 2010, The New England Journal of Medicine independently
found that Health Dialog's chronic disease management services deliver a 400% return on
investment."); King & Moulton, supra note 27, at 472-73; O'Connor et al., supra note 39,

at 67.
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management. 42 Notably, the United States' recent health reform, PPACA,
promotes SDM as a model for clinical practice.43
The SDM model is able to accomplish all these goals in part by virtue of
its reliance on decision-support tools to supplement the informed consent process.
Decision-support tools are available for a variety of clinical conditions: The most
common ones address the treatment of breast cancer, prostate cancer, osteoarthritis
and osteoporosis, childbirth, and end-of-life care.44 These tools can take a variety
of forms, including brochures, videos, interactive websites, CD-ROMs, as well as
"structured personal coaching" with a trained intermediary.45 Such tools "collect
and analyze the latest clinical evidence regarding the risks and benefits of different
treatment options," including why there may be a lack of evidence to support one
treatment over another, "and then present the information in a manner patients can
understand.A6 These tools are written in simple and easy-to-understand language
that is accessible to patients with varying degrees of health literacy. They are selfdirected, which means that a patient can spend as much or as little time exploring
the information as she needs to. They often include graphics or diagrams to help
explain the underlying medical issue and how it can be treated. They provide
opportunities for the patient to take notes and identify questions to discuss with her
physician. The process of reviewing a decision aid is, in short, exactly the sort of
42.
See David C. Wheeler et al., Applying Strategies from Libertarian
Paternalismto Decision Making for Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA) Screening, 11 BMC
CANCER 148, 149 (2011) (noting that some physicians have been slow to adopt shared
decision-making because of "the time required for a detailed discussion of clinical options
with patients" and that the use of patient decision aids may remedy this problem).

43.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3506,

124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36 (2012)).
44.
See Patient Decision Aids, OTrAWA REs. Hosp. INsT., http://decision
aid.ohri.ca/AZlist.html (last modified June 27, 2012).
45.
CMS REPORT, supra note 40, at 2.
46.
King & Moulton, supra note 27, at 464; see also Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act § 3506 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(b)(1)) ("The term

'patient decision aid' means an educational tool that helps patients, caregivers or authorized

representatives understand and communicate their beliefs and preferences related to their

treatment options, and to decide with their health care provider what treatments are best for
them based on their treatment options, scientific evidence, circumstances, beliefs, and
preferences."); CMS REPORT, supra note 40, at 2 ("Formal shared decision-making

processes are generally facilitated through the use of electronic or paper-based patient
decision support aids, which are often developed by third parties and licensed for use by

health plans, hospitals or physicians. Through tools such as booklets, videos, interactive
computer programs, and structured personal coaching, patients receive evidence-based
information about treatment options and outcomes that is specifically designed to help them
evaluate tradeoffs in the context of their own feelings and preferences. Decision support
aids supplement direct communication between the physician and patient by offering
patients an opportunity to process complex-and possibly frightening-information at their
own pace, using information that addresses the emotional as well as the clinical aspects of
medical care. Patient decision aids have three core elements: clinical information, 'values
clarification,' and guidance to help patients make and communicate their treatment
decisions.").
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process envisioned by advocates of informed consent-a step-by-step tutorial
aimed at ensuring patient comprehension of the facts necessary to make an
informed medical decision.
Moreover, unlike traditional informed consent documents which only
provide factual information, decision aids also assist patients in identifying the
values and preferences that are important to them and in guiding them through the
process of matching their values with available treatment options. 47 For example, a
prostate cancer patient who hopes to live as long as possible will have different
treatment preferences than a patient who hopes to avoid the unpleasant side effects
of treatment, such as incontinence and impotence. Many tools provide
opportunities for patients to take note of the values that are most important to them
and to track their changing opinions as they learn new information about treatment
options.
While some decision-support tools are used by physicians in face-to-face
clinical encounters, others are intended for independent patient use.48 Sometimes, a
physician may "prescribe" 49 such a tool for the patient to review before her next
appointment, which then better prepares the patient for the in-office informed
consent conversation.o Viewed as part of the SDM process, decision aids are
intended as complements to, not replacements for, the physician-patient
interaction.5 ' They encourage the patient to engage in a deliberative process earlier
and more thoroughly than has often been the case in traditional informed consent
52
practice and have been lauded as a significant improvement over the status quo.
Decision-support tools for SDM have been written and published by a
variety of organizations, 53 including professional associations, 54 government

47.
See generally Glyn Elwyn et al., Investing in Deliberation:A Definition and
Classification of Decision Support Interventions for People Facing Dfficult Health
Decisions, 30 MED. DECISION MAKING 701, 702 (2010); King & Moulton, supra note 27, at
464-65; Annette M. O'Connor et al., Toward the 'Tipping Point': Decision Aids and
Informed PatientChoice, 26 HEALTH AFF. 716, 716-17 (2007).
Elwyn et al., supra note 47, at 703.
48.
49.
CMS REPORT, supra note 40, at 3.

Historically, the informed consent process is conducted as a conversation
50.
between doctor and patient about the risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, various
treatment options. This discussion is documented in the patient's chart, and more
importantly, via the patient's signature on a formal informed consent document. Schuck,
supra note 27, at 935. The legal requirements for informed consent may be set forth in
statutes and regulations, as well as common law doctrine. See id at 901, 916-19 (discussing
regulatory disclosure requirements, and statutory and common law grounds of informed
consent doctrine).
See Elwyn et al., supra note 47, at 702-03.
51.

52.
See, e.g., Suzanne V. Arnold et al., Converting the Informed Consentfrom a
Perfunctory Process to an Evidence-Based Foundationfor Patient Decision Making, 1
CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR QUALITY & OUTCOMES 21, 27 (2008); King & Moulton,
supra note 27, at 463; Harlan M. Krumholz, Informed Consent to Promote Patient-Centered
Care, 303 JAMA 1190, 1191 (2010).
Patient DecisionAids, supra note 44.
53.
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agencies,55 hospitals and health centers, 56 non-profit organizations, 57 and for-profit
companies.5 8 This is in contrast to traditional informed consent documents, which
are most commonly prepared by the healthcare institutions that are actually
providing the treatment.

II. QUALITY CONCERNS
In its report on the implementation of SDM through the use of decisionsupport tools, the American Medical Association ("AMA") Council on Medical
Service recognized that "[a]ssuring the clinical quality and ethical design of patient
decision aids will become increasingly important" as they are incorporated into the
decision-making process. 59 Virtually every commentator who has written on this
topic has expressed similar concerns. 6 0 In particular, many have called attention to
the likelihood of conflict-of-interest or bias in the development of decision-support
tools. The AMA, for example, has noted the possibility that "[d]ecision support
tools could be created that are misleading or biased toward or against certain
treatment choices, in an effort to encourage patients to choose less expensive
options." 61 Jamie King and Benjamin Moulton, the leading legal scholars writing
about SDM, have also noted that "decision aids have the potential to be biased or
potentially misleading." 62
To be sure, today's patients obtain a great deal of medical information
that is created by third parties and used outside the physician-patient relationship.
The Internet is perhaps the most frequented source of such information-websites

54.
See, e.g., AM. Soc'Y OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, DECISION AID: STAGE IV NONSMALL CELL LUNG CANCER (NSCLC) FIRST-LINE CHEMOTHERAPY (2004), available at
http://www.asco.org/ASCO/Downloads/Cancer%2Policy/2Oand%2OClinical%20Affairs/

Clinical%20Affairs%20(derivative%20products)/NSCLC/NSCLC%20First%201ine%2ODe
cision%20Aid%2011.6.09.pdf.
55.
See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 2; U.S.
Dep't Health & Human Servs., Patient Decision Aids, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. &
QUALITY, http://www.effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/index.cfim/guides-cmece-and-other-reso
urces-for-clinicians/patient-decision-aids (last visited July 2, 2012).
56.
See, e.g., Hormone Therapy: Is it Right For You?, MAYO CLINIC (May 31,
2012), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/hormone-therapy/W000046.
57.
See, e.g., COCHRANE MUSCULOSKELETAL GROUP, http://musculoskeletal.coch
rane.org/ (last visited July 2, 2012); HEALTHWISE, http://www.healthwise.org/ (last visited

July 2, 2012).
See, e.g., EMMI SOLUTIONS, http://www.emmisolutions.com (last visited July
58.
2, 2012); HEALTH DIALOG, http://www.healthdialog.com/Main/default (last visited July 2,
2012); OPTUMHEALTH, http://www.optumhealth.com/ (last visited July 2, 2012).
59.
CMS REPORT, supra note 40, at 3.
60.
Indeed, concerns about decision-aid quality initially prompted the
International Patient Decision Aids Standards Collaboration's development of a quality
framework. See Glyn Elwyn et al., Int'l Patient Decision Aids Standards (IPDAS)

Collaboration, Developing a Quality Criteria Frameworkfor Patient Decision Aid, 333

BMJ 417, 417 (2006).
61.
CMS REPORT, supra note 40, at 4.
62.

King & Moulton, supra note 27, at 466.
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such as the Mayo Clinic's,63 the NIH's, 64 and those of many private insurers,
provide a wealth of information about health and medical treatment. A patient who
has already been diagnosed can also peruse dozens of patient-support websites
where people post about their experiences with various forms of treatment.65 The
quality of the health information available on the Internet varies widely,66 and
many physicians recognize the need to counsel their patients to be more discerning
consumers of Web-based information. While one might explain some of the
erroneous health information provided on the Internet by reference to the ease with
which anyone can publish their views, even more traditional forms of information
can be equally faulty. Case law is rife with suits by plaintiffs alleging injury as a
result of misinformation in printed books or materials, 67 including a dieting book
written by an osteopathic surgeon 6 and a pamphlet published by the National
Hemophilia Foundation. 69 Moreover, both the frequency of litigation against
healthcare providers and institutions for failure of informed consent, as well as the
body of research about the failures of the traditional informed consent process, 70
suggest quality issues with the status quo.
Third-party decision aids, however, share three important features that
increase the likelihood of misinformation or bias as compared to other patient
educational materials. First, while traditional informed consent documents are
typically drafted by the healthcare institution treating a patient, decision-support
tools are often created by third parties not otherwise involved in the patient's
care-for example, non-profit organizations, insurance companies, or for-profit
medical education companies. 7 1 Second, many decision aids, although
"prescribed" by physicians and so bearing the imprimatur of medical authority, are
intended for independent patient use outside the clinical encounter, which means
that physicians may have limited opportunities to mediate or interpret the
information provided by these tools. 72 Finally, decision aids are used primarily in
the context of preference-sensitive decisions that implicate personal values; many
of these decisions, such as those related to end-of-life care and reproductive care,

63.
MAYO CLINIC, supra note 23.
64.
Health Information,supra note 24.
65.
See, e.g., Stories of Hope, AM. CANCER Soc'Y, http://www.cancer.org/
Treatment/SurvivorshipDuringandAfterTreatment/StoriesofHope/index (last visited July 2,
2012); A Voice of Patient Engagement, E-PATIENT DAVE, http://epatientdave.com/ (last

modified June 18, 2012).
66.
Gretchen P. Purcell et al., Quality ofHealth Information on the Internet, 324
BMJ 557, 557 (2002).
67.
See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir.

1991).
68.

Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).

69.
In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 837
(N.D. 111.
1998).
70.
71.
72.

See supra Part I.
See infra Part H.A.
See infraPart II.B.
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involve moral and political controversies that may impact the way information is
provided to patients."
A. Third-Party Development
Receiving information from a physician or reviewing it with a physician's
guidance is certainly no guarantee of accuracy. When health information is
provided by parties with financial or other conflicts of interest, the possibility of
misinformation is significantly increased. To cite just one example, consider the
recent outcry surrounding the development and use of clinical pathways and
practice guidelines in medical care." Clinical practice guidelines are tools used by
physicians to determine the best course of treatment for a given patient's
condition; such guidelines represent "best practices" for treatment in light of
available medical evidence. There may be a variety of clinical guidelines on any
given condition created by professional associations seeking to improve quality of
care, hospitals seeking to standardize care, or insurers seeking to limit the cost of
care. As noted by Ronen Avraham, although all clinical guidelines are developed
with significant physician input, the guidelines "notoriously vary depending on
which group is giving them." 76 With respect to mammograms, for example,
Avraham posits that "[m]alpractice insurers . .. may recommend yearly
mammograms, even if they are not necessary, because they bear the costs of
lawsuits for late diagnoses of breast cancer." 7 7 Even when professional
associations write guidelines, their "validity . .. may be questionable for a variety
of reasons," including obsolescence and changes in practice, insufficient evidence,
and conflicts of interest (especially where professional associations partner with
pharmaceutical or medical device companies).

73.
74.

See infra Part II.C.
Nananda Col et al., Abstract, Empirical Evidence of Bias in Decision Aids,

15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 81, 82 (supp. 3, 2010) (concluding that decision aids sponsored
by government agencies and insurance companies more strongly emphasize the benefits of
watchful waiting and the risks of surgery as compared to decision aids sponsored by
academic institutions); Allan S. Detsky, Sources of Bias for Authors of Clinical Practice

Guidelines, 175 CMAJ 1033, 1033 (2006) (describing financial conflicts, professional
conflicts, and "participants' previously established 'stake' in an issue" as sources of
potential bias).
75.
While the Institute of Medicine has issued standards for promulgating
clinical guidelines, "I worry about the extent to which these standards will be followed."
Ronen Avraham, Op-Ed., A Market Solutionfor Malpractice,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2011, at
A31.
Id.
76.
77.
Id. Therefore, Avraham suggests that private for-profit regulators be in
charge of creating guidelines and that they be "liable if their guidelines were found to
deviate from optimal care." Id. Avraham writes, "Almost every other product Americans
encounter is subject to laws that guarantee that the producer suffers when its product is
subpar. There's no reason medical guidelines should be any different." Id.
78.

Ronen Avraham, ClinicalPracticeGuidelines: The WarpedIncentives in the
AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 29 (2011).

U.S. Healthcare System, 37
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The problems with decision aids produced by third parties can be
illustrated by examining the fictional brochure discussed in this Article's
Introduction.79 The brochure begins with the statement that "research has not yet
proven that the benefits of testing outweigh the risks," a statement which in itself
is subject to dispute. The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force ("USPSTF")
recently gave PSA screening a "Grade D" recommendation, finding insufficient
evidence "to assess the balance of benefits and harms of prostate cancer screening
in men younger than age 75 years."80 However, this recommendation has been
extremely controversial. 8 ' In fact, the USPSTF made a similar recommendation in
2009, which was sent back for review as a result of "public uproar." 82 Some
commentators have described the USPSTF's final report as "riddled with errors"
and arguably "biased" against PSA screening.
The booklet also states that "very few men" with normal PSA levels
actually have prostate cancer. A qualitative description of this kind ("very few") is
likely to give John a less accurate perspective than a quantitative one (e.g.,
"l%").84 Moreover, although some research suggests that only 1-2% of men get
false negative results from PSA screening,85 other studies have demonstrated that
the rate of false negatives may be as high as 36%.86 If APAE had chosen to use the
higher figure (or a range of values), the reasonable patient in John's position might
have a very different perception of the implications of a negative PSA result.
Further, the booklet includes three patient testimonials. Of the three, only
one patient decides to pursue both PSA testing and treatment. The booklet does
not, however, mention that despite the 60% chance of side effects like
incontinence and impotence, the vast majority of men diagnosed with prostate
cancer-90 0/o-nevertheless seek treatment.87 As noted by the International Patient
Decision Aid Standards Collaboration, "even a 'balanced' presentation of views
can potentially give false impressions that there is an equal split in opinion about

79.
While fictional, the brochure contains information compiled from a number
of publicly available patient decision aids. See, e.g., supra notes 4-15.
Prostate Cancer Screening Communication Conference, CTRS.

80.

FOR DISEASE

http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/prostate/whatcdc is doing/confer
ence.htm (last modified May 22, 2012).
CONTROL

&

PREVENTION,

81.
Gardiner Harris, Panel's Advice on Prostate Test Sets up Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2011, at Al; cf Gina Kolata, Behind Cancer Guidelines, Quest for Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at A19.
82.
Brownlee & Lenzer, supra note 2.
83.
Andrew J. Vickers & Hans Lilja, Urological Cancer: Time for Another
Rethink on Prostate Cancer Screening, 9 NATuRE REVIEWS CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 7 (2012).

84.

Annette M. O'Connor et al., Decision Aids for People Facing Health

Treatment or Screening Decisions, 1 COCHRANE DATABASE SYST. REV. CDO01431 (2009);

Malcolm Man-Son-Hing et al., The Effect of Qualitative vs. Quantitative Presentation of
Probability Estimates on Patient Decision-Making: A Randomized Trial, 5 HEALTH
EXPECTATIONS 246, 253 (2002).

85.
86.
87.

See supra note 7.
See supra note 16.
See supra note 18.
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treatment, when in fact 90% of patients recommend or accept a particular
option."
Finally, the booklet does not include citations to the original sources of
the statistics it presents, so neither John nor his physician have the opportunity to
double-check the factual information in the booklet.89 Because we do not have any
information about the fictional group that created the booklet, we cannot speculate
on its motivations for choosing and presenting information in the way that it did.
APAE's presentation of the options available to John, however, is certainly
influenced by its motivations and is likely very different from how the options
would have been presented had the booklet instead been prepared by a professional
organization of urologic surgeons and radiation oncologists. o
B. Imprimatur ofAuthority and Limited Physician Mediation
A second factor relevant to the likelihood of harm arising from faulty
decision aids is the way patients are intended to use them. While decision-support
tools are intended as complements to, not replacements for, the physician-patient
interaction,91 proponents value them in part because they lessen the burden on
physicians in discussing treatment options with their patients. Of course, when
physicians "prescribe" decision aids for patient use at home, the chances of
Phyllis Butow et al., Using Personal Stories, in IPDAS COLLABORATION
24, 25 (Annette O'Connor et al. eds., Feb. 17, 2005), availableat
ipdas.ohri.ca/IPDASBackground.pdf. The IPDAS Collaboration Background Document
88.

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT

also notes that "inclusion of written patient testimonials . .. significantly influenced
hypothetical treatment choices. The number of testimonials in favour of either option
strongly influenced choice." Id. at 26; see also Peter A. Ubel et al., The Inclusion of Patient
Testimonials in Decision Aids: Effects on Treatment Choices, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING
60, 65 (2001) (concluding that patient testimonials "can significantly influence hypothetical
treatment choices").
Tim Whelan & Michael Pignone, Basing Information on Up-to-Date
89.
Scientific Evidence, in IPDAS COLLABORATION BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 50, 51 (Annette

O'Connor et al. eds., Feb. 17, 2005), available at ipdas.ohri.ca/IPDAS Background.pdf
(noting that only 15.8% of decision aids provided specific citations to original sources,
52.6% provided directions to a separate resource where patients could find citations to
original sources, and 31.5% provided neither); see Michael Barry, Disclosing Conflicts of
Interests, in IPDAS COLLABORATION BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 36, 37 (Annette O'Connor
et al. eds., Feb. 17, 2005), available at ipdas.ohri.ca/IPDAS Background.pdf (noting that
although financial interests or specialty-specific management preferences could bias
decision aids, "only the minority of relevant financial relationships on the part of the
original authors were actually disclosed as part of the publication process").
See Barry, supra note 89, at 37 ("Specialty perspective can also have a strong
90.
effect on views regarding optimal medical management. For example, for clinically
localized prostate cancer (a common topic for patient decision aids), urologic surgeons are
much more positive about radical prostatectomy while radiation oncologists are much more
positive about radiation therapy as a treatment option .... ); Brownlee & Lenzer, supra
note 2 ("The dueling narratives of PSA testing boil down to the way each side frames the
potential for harm from the disease compared with the collateral damage from the test and
subsequent treatment."); Col et al., supra note 74, at 82.
See Elwyn et al., supra note 47, at 702-03.
91.
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informative conversation with the physician at the next appointment are certainly
greater-indeed, that is part of their appeal. However, patients may find decisionsupport tools on their own-many are available on the Internet-and there is no
guarantee that the physician will be available to mediate this content. Thus, faulty
decision aids may impact patient choices in such a way that their physicians do not
have an opportunity to correct. Moreover, when a decision aid is offered to the
patient by a medical provider, it may bear the imprimatur of authority in the
patient's eyes, despite the fact that it was created by a third party uninvolved in the
patient's care.
Michigan allows patients to bypass the physician interaction altogether by
offering an online alternative to the traditional informed consent process. A patient
seeking an abortion may view state-sponsored abortion materials at the website of
the Michigan Department of Community Health, print and sign a confirmation
92
form, and present it to her physician as evidence of informed consent. In this
situation, third-party decision-support tools replace the traditional informed
consent process.
Another example of the use of decision-support tools in situations with
limited opportunities for physician mediation is recent legislation passed by South
Dakota, which requires women seeking abortions to obtain a consultation at a
pregnancy counseling center before consenting to the procedure. 93 Around the
country these centers, which many claim are aimed at dissuading women from
95
getting abortions, 94 are often staffed by laypersons with no clinical expertise. It is

92.
MICHIGAN.GOV,

Dep't of Cmty. Health, Michigan's Informed Consent for Abortion Law,

http://www.michigan.gov/mdch/0,4612,7-132-2940_4909-45202--,00.html

(last visited July 4, 2012).
Note, however, that the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota
93.
enjoined the implementation of this law on June 30, 2011 and the state of South Dakota has
chosen not to appeal the injunction. AG: State Will Not Appeal Abortion Law Injunction,
SIoux CITY JOURNAL.COM (July 26, 2011, 5:55 PM), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/stateand-regional/south-dakota/article_2064e882-b7c6-1 I eO-al 5c-00lcc4c002e0.html.
See Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling
94.
Policies and the FundamentalPrinciples of Informed Consent, GUTTMACHER POL'Y REv.,
Fall 2007, at 12.
NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.C. FOUND., THE TRUTH REVEALED: NORTH
95.
CAROLINA'S CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS 11, 17 (2011), availableat http://www.prochoice

nc.org/assets/bin/pdfs/201 1NARAL CPCReport VO5 web.pdf (comparing state licensing
requirements for social workers and pregnancy center volunteers, and noting that 92% of
crisis pregnancy centers surveyed do not have medical professionals on staff); S. MALIA
RICHMOND-CRUM & MELISSA KLEDER, NARAL PRO CHOICE MD FUND, MARYLAND CRISIS
PREGNANCY CENTER INVESTIGATIONS: THE TRUTH REVEALED 4 (2008) ("[V]ery few of the
centers employ medical professionals or are required to adhere to medical regulations.");
see also Crisis Counseling Training, SANFORD CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER
http://www.sanfordcpc.com/wp/?page id=21 (last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (targeting
"volunteer lay-counselors" to counsel women about "abortion risks and alternatives"). In
contrast to the highly regulated medical fields, there is as yet no legal oversight of these
centers or the information their staff provides. NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.C. FOUND., supra

note 95, at 11 (noting that neither North Carolina regulations nor federal regulations like
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unclear whether patients who receive medical information in this context have
sufficient opportunity to clarify or confirm information with their own physicians.
This is particularly troubling in light of a 2006 report by the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Government Reform finding that 87% of federally
funded pregnancy resource centers provided "false or misleading information
about the health effects of abortion." 96
C. Values and Controversy
Finally, the possibility of misinformation or bias is particularly high when
the decision aids deal with value-laden medical decisions, which is commonly the
case because decision aids are used primarily for preference-sensitive care. One
obvious example of this arises in the context of abortion, where state laws often
require women to use decision aids before consenting to an abortion.
More than 30 states have enacted abortion-specific informed consent laws
(also called "Women's Right to Know Laws") that establish statutory disclosure
97
requirements for women seeking to terminate a pregnancy. Although physicians
typically make disclosures about the risks of a procedure during the informed
consent process, many states permit these disclosures to be made by way of a
98
pamphlet published and distributed by the state's department of health. These
HIPAA govern crisis pregnancy centers, because these centers are not medically licensed);
Vitoria Lin and Cynthia Dailard, Crisis Pregnancy Centers Seek to IncreasePoliticalClout,
Secure Government Subsidy, GUTTMACHER REP. PUB. POL'Y, May 2002, at 4, 6 (describing

lack of public scrutiny and government regulation of crisis pregnancy centers); Mark L.

Rienzi, The History and Constitutionalityof Maryland's PregnancySpeech Regulations, 26
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 223, 241 (2009) (noting that pregnancy centers are not

engaged in the practice of medicine and therefore not subject to medical regulatory
requirements). However, efforts toward this type of regulation have been made in New
York, Maryland, and California. See Michael Howard Saul, Judge Blocks NYC's AbortionDisclosure Law, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2011, 2:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
McKinley,
Jesse
metropolis/2011/07/13/judge-blocks-citys-abortion-disclosure-law/;
PoliticiansOpen Fronton Abortion in Bay Area, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2011, at A12.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS Div., MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON Gov'T
96.
REFORM, 109TH CONG., FALSE AND MISLEADING HEALTH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY
FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS 7, available at http://www.chsource

book.com/articles/waxman2.pdf.
Gold & Nash, supra note 94, at 7. Like any patient seeking medical
97.
treatment, a woman seeking an abortion must provide informed consent for the procedure
she is about to undergo. Many states require the physician, as part of the informed consent
process, to provide the patient with an informational pamphlet published by the state
department of health; such pamphlets often emphasize the risks of abortion as compared to
the risks of childbirth and sometimes include scientifically questionable information. Critics
have argued that the information provided by the state as part of the informed consent
process is unfairly biased against abortion; indeed, some proponents of abortion informed
consent laws have admitted that their purpose is to dissuade women from having abortions.
See generally id; Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light,
Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2011).
See, e.g., A WOMAN's RIGHT TO KNow (Tex. Dep't of Health ed., 2003),
98.

available at http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/wrtk/pdf/booklet.pdf.
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pamphlets comply with the disclosure requirements of abortion informed consent
statutes and typically explain the characteristics of the fetus at various stages of
development (incorporating statutorily required images or photographs), the
various types of abortion procedures and their risks, the risks of childbirth, and the
various social-support services available to women with children. 99 According to
critics, many of these documents are explicitly or implicitly aimed at dissuading
women from choosing abortion. 00 According to the Guttmacher Institute, for
example, the information presented in state-mandated abortion disclosures is often
"either out-of-date, biased or both."o'0 Many physicians and researchers have
challenged these brochures as being biased or factually incorrect, especially with
respect to risk factors that have not been scientifically proven, such as the risk of
psychological and emotional harm,' 02 the risk of future infertility,'0 3 the risk of

Sawicki, supra note 97, at 7-10.
See, e.g., id at 12; Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, GovernmentScripted Consent: When Medical Ethics and Law Collide, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 21
(2009) (describing state informed consent laws as "a coercive process focusing almost
exclusively on risks, misinformation, and implied governmental opprobrium," and
"grounded in dogmatic and uncompromising ideological speech"); Chinu6 Turner
99.
100.

Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical Accuracy of StateDeveloped Abortion Counseling Materials, GUTTMACHER POL'Y REv., Fall 2006, at 6

(noting that abortion requirements "do not always measure up to the gold standard of
informed consent. . .. [T]he information presented is either out-of-date, biased or both.");
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion,and Emotion: Implications of Social Science
Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REv. 1, 22 (2008); Rebecca Dresser,
From Double Standardto Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1599, 1599 (2007).

Richardson & Nash, supra note 100, at 6.
101.
A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO KNow, supra note 98, at 16 (highlighting "serious
102.
psychological effects after their abortion, including depression, grief, anxiety, lowered selfesteem, regret, suicidal thoughts and behavior, sexual dysfunction, avoidance of emotional
attachment, flashbacks, and substance abuse."); see Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 653
F.3d 662, 671 (8th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he record does not demonstrate a generally recognized
causal connection between abortion and suicide."), vacated in part on reh'g en banc, 662
F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011); Trine Munk-Olsen et al., Induced First-TrimesterAbortion and
Risk of Mental Disorder, 364 NEw ENG. J. MED. 332, 332 (2011) (finding that the

prevalence of mental health problems increases after childbirth but not after abortion); Gail
Erlick Robinson et al., Is There An "Abortion Trauma Syndrome"? Critiquing the Evidence,
17 HARv. REV. PSYCHIATRY 268, 278 (2009) (finding methodological problems among

empirical studies drawing a connection between abortion and later psychological trauma).
A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO KNow, supra note 98, at 17 (noting that some
103.
abortion-related complications "may make it difficult or impossible to become pregnant in
the future or to carry a pregnancy to term" and citing the risk of premature birth after
abortion doubled); see Janet R. Daling & Irvin Emanuel, InducedAbortion and Subsequent
Outcome ofPregnancy in a Series ofAmerican Women, 297 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1241 (1977)
(finding no relationship between history of induced abortion and subsequent pregnancies

involving low birth rate, premature delivery, stillbirth, miscarriage, or other complications);
Peter Frank et al., The Effect of Induced Abortion on Subsequent Fertility, 100 BJOG 575,
575 (1993) (finding no relation between induced abortion and subsequent infertility); Kaisa
Raatikainen et al., Induced Abortion: Not an Independent Risk Factorfor Pregnancy
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breast cancer,'1' and the presence or absence of fetal pain.' 05 This is particularly
problematic in light of the fact that purportedly neutral state departments of health
draft these publications; there is unfortunately no information on how they do so or
whether they offer any opportunity for public comment or notification. South
Dakota's requirement that women seeking abortions first obtain anti-abortion
counseling at a crisis pregnancy center demonstrates even more clearly how
ideological beliefs about value-laden decisions may impact the nature of legally
required disclosures and the content of associated decision aids.
Women's reproductive health, however, is hardly the only context in
which value judgments might arise within decision aids. End-of-life medical care
has generated heated public debates about whether providing patients with
information about end-of-life planning is useful for furthering patient autonomy or
indicative of malicious state efforts to limit access to care for the elderly.' 06
Outcome, but a Challengefor Health Counseling, 16 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 587, 587

(2006) (finding "no evidence of adverse pregnancy outcomes" after induced abortion);
Carol J. Rowland Hogue et al, The Effects of Induced Abortion on Subsequent
Reproduction, 4 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVIEWS 66, 88 (1982) (finding that complications in

pregnancies occurring after induced abortions "occur[] so infrequently that... risk is not
significantly elevated").
A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO KNow, supra note 98, at 17 ("While there are studies
104.
that have found an increased risk of developing breast cancer after an induced abortion,
some studies have found no overall risk."). See Lynne L. Bartholomew & David A. Grimes,
Focus on Primary Care: The Alleged Association Between Induced Abortion and Risk of
Breast Cancer: Biology or Bias?, 53 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURv. 708, 714
(1998) (concluding that there is fair evidence that abortion does not increase the risk of
breast cancer); Valerie Beral et al., Breast Cancer and Abortion: CollaborativeReanalysis
of Data from 53 Epidemiological Studies, Including 83 000 Women with Breast Cancer
from 16 Countries, 363 LANCET 1007, 1010 (2004) (finding pregnancies that end as a
spontaneous or induced abortion do not increase a woman's risk of developing breast
cancer); Katherine DeLellis Henderson et al., Incomplete Pregnancy is Not Associated with
Breast Cancer Risk: The Cahfornia Teachers Study, 77 CONTRACEPTION 391, 391-96
(2008) (finding no statistically significant association between any measure of incomplete
pregnancy and breast cancer risk); Gillian K. Reeves et al., Breast Cancer Risk in Relation
to Abortion: Results from the EPC study, 119 INT. J. CANCER 1741, 1743 (2006) (showing
evidence of the lack of an adverse effect of induced abortion on breast cancer risk); see also
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, ACOG Committee Opinion No. 434: Induced
Abortion and Breast Cancer Risk, 113 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1417, 1417 (2009)
(noting that early studies had "significant methodological problems," and concluding that
"there is no association between induced abortion and breast cancer").
Compare A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO KNow, supra note 98, at 5 (noting that
105.
"[s]ome experts have concluded that the unborn child is probably able to feel pain" at 20
weeks), with Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic MultidisciplinaryReview of the
Evidence, 294 JAMA 947, 947 (2005) (concluding that fetal perception of pain is "unlikely"
before the third trimester), and Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on
Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
111, 143 (2008) (concluding that some statements in state-mandated educational material on
fetal pain conflicts with scientific literature and that all statements are misleading).
106.
See Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False 'Death Panel' Rumor Has Some
FamiliarRoots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at Al.
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Moreover, the debate about values is not limited to specific treatment contexts.
Consider, for example, a widely contested provision within PPACA relating to the
use of comparative effectiveness research, generally defined as research that
systematically compares the effectiveness of various treatment options to
determine which healthcare interventions are most appropriate for which patients.
While supporting the development of comparative effectiveness research, PPACA
prohibits the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") from using
such research in making coverage or reimbursement decisions "in a manner that
precludes, or with the intent to discourage, an individual from choosing a health
care treatment based on how the individual values the tradeoffbetween extending
the length of their life and the risk of disability."'0 ' Given that decision-support
tools are used primarily for preference-sensitive and value-based decisions, even
those tools that are used in the context of seemingly uncontroversial conditionsprostate cancer or breast cancer, for example-may implicate political concerns
about the balance of patient values regarding quality and length of life.

III. CURRENT CONTROL OF DECISION-SUPPORT TOOLS
Despite concerns about the quality of third-party decision-support tools,
there has been no ex ante governmental regulation of decision-support tools to date
and only limited private oversight. Moreover, there currently exists no opportunity
for ex post recovery under the tort system by patients harmed as a result of faulty
or misleading decision aids. It is commendable, then, that PPACA's proposal for
incorporating patient decision aids as part of SDM establishes a framework for a
quasi-governmental certification process. This Part describes existing and
proposed measures for controlling the quality of decision aids.'0o
A. Private Oversight
Some commentators concerned with the quality of decision-support tools
have recommended a formal credentialing process to ensure that the tools
produced are high quality. King and Moulton recommend that "the information
provided in decision aids ... be approved by credentialed, neutral bodies made up
of lay people, physicians and researchers who are trained to make such
decisions[.]"' 09 Harlan Krumholz recommends that the information in patient
decision aids be "written by expert groups empanelled by the Department of
Health and Human Services."" 0 No legal mechanism, however, currently exists for
evaluating and certifying decision-support tools before they are adopted for patient
use.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 6301, 124
107.
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-l(d)(1) (2012)) (emphasis
added).
Discussion of non-legal mechanisms for controlling the quality of medical
108.
care, such as professional ethics, is beyond the scope of this Article.
King & Moulton, supra note 27, at 466.
109.
Harlan M. Krumholz, Informed Consent to PromotePatient-CenteredCare,
110.
303 JAMA 1190, 1190 (2010).

HeinOnline -- 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 642 2012

643

PATIENT PROTECTION

20121

A few private organizations have begun taking steps to evaluate the
quality of available decision aids."' The Ottawa Hospital Research Institute, for
example, collects an inventory of publicly available decision aids that meet a
limited set of quality criteria: they must be recent, provide references to scientific
evidence used, and report any conflicts of interest.'1 2 More compelling is the
International Patient Decision Aid Standards ("IPDAS") Collaboration, which has
developed a more thorough checklist for evaluating the quality of decision-support
tools.1 3 Their checklist is broken up into categories: Content, Development
Process, and Effectiveness. Many of the quality measures in the IPDAS checklist
speak to the kinds of quality concerns highlighted in Part II, including
"present[ing] probabilities of outcomes in an unbiased and understandable way,"
using "up to date scientific evidence that is cited in a reference section or technical
document," and "disclos[ing] conflicts of interest."ll 4 The IPDAS Collaboration
expects its criteria to be "helpful to a wide variety of individuals and organizations
that use and/or develop patient decision aids."'"5 The New America Foundation
("NAF"), a nonprofit public policy institute, has recently begun a similar effort to
"produce a consensus document outlining the criteria for certification of aids and
the process by which certification should take place."" 6 NAF plans to circulate the
final document to the Secretary of HHS, with the goal of "guiding the
establishment of [national] standards for decision aids."" 7
B. Ex Ante Regulation and Credentialing
As of yet, there is no public regulation or oversight of decision-support
tools. This is both problematic and surprising because nearly every other aspect of
medical care and health information, from physician licensure to pharmaceutical
marketing, is subject to statutory requirements and administrative regulations.
Indeed, medicine is one of the most highly regulated industries in the United
States. History has demonstrated that few industries, medicine included, are able to
self-regulate in a way that offers sufficient protections for consumers. In the vast
majority of cases the government has stepped in to take control." 8
Although there is currently no regulatory mechanism for patient decision
aids, a proposal to this effect was passed as part of PPACA's efforts to facilitate

Ill.
112.

See generally CMS REPORT, supra note 40.
PatientDecisionAids, supra note 44.

113.

INT'L PATIENT DECIsION AID STANDARDS COLLABORATION,

CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE QUALITY OF PATIENT DECISION AIDS

http://ipdas.ohri.ca/IPDAS_checklist.pdf.
Id.
114.
115.
INT'L PATIENT DECISION AID
http://ipdas.ohri.ca/ (last visited July 16, 2012).
116.

New

NEwAMERICA.NET,

America

Foundation,

STANDARDS

IPDAS 2005:
(2005), available at

(IPDAS)

COLLABORATION,

Certification of Patient Decision Aids,

http://newamerica.net/events/20 11/patient decision aids (last visited

July 7, 2012).

117.

Id.

118.

See Arlen, supra note 20, at 1121, 1126.
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shared decision-making. 119 PPACA defines a patient decision aid as "an
educational tool that helps patients, caregivers or authorized representatives
understand and communicate their beliefs and preferences related to their
treatment options, and to decide with their health care provider what treatments are
best for them based on their treatment options, scientific evidence, circumstances,
beliefs, and preferences."' 20 The proposal requires the Secretary of HHS to
contract with an entity that will evaluate and certify decision aids. The entity,
which must include "a broad range of experts and key stakeholders," will be
charged with developing "consensus-based standards" for evaluating and
certifying patient decision aids. 12 1 Although the details of the process are
unspecified, additional procedures will surely develop as the regulations are
drafted, which makes this a prime opportunity for evaluating the optimal means of
ensuring patient safety. For the purposes of this Article, the regulatory proposal
established in PPACA will be used as a representative example of the pure ex ante
regulatory approach.

C. Ex Post Recovery
Given that the use of decision-support tools is a relatively recent
development, it is perhaps understandable that there are as yet no regulatory
mechanisms for ensuring their quality. In the absence of regulations, however, one
might expect that tort law would provide some remedy for those injured by faulty
decision aids, in turn incentivizing decision aid creators to maintain a high-quality
product.122 Surprisingly, however, the tort system is poorly equipped to deal with
such claims, leaving most (if not all) plaintiffs who wish to bring suit against the
creator of a faulty, misleading, or biased decision-support tool without an
opportunity for redress.123
Although a strict product liability claim is likely the most appealing claim
from the plaintiffs perspective, decision-support tools do not satisfy the legal
definition of a "product" for these purposes. Courts have consistently held that
119.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3506,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36 (2012)).
Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(b)(1)).
120.
Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(c)). PPACA also establishes
121.
the availability of grants to support Shared Decisionmaking Resource Centers that will
"provide technical assistance to providers" and develop best practices for the effective use
of decision aids. Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(e)).
This Article does not fully address the prospect of liability on the part of
122.
physicians who "prescribe" faulty decision aids to their patients. See infra Part V. I have
argued in a prior article that physicians who use decision aids may face traditional
malpractice liability if they over-rely on decision aids at the expense of an informed consent
conversation. However, policy arguments suggest that where the decision aid itself is faulty,
the physician who prescribes it ought not face liability for the negligence of third-party
information providers beyond their control. Sawicki, supra note 25, at 9.
The limitations on liability for creators of faulty medical tools have already
123.
been recognized in the context of clinical practice guidelines. See generally Avraham, supra
note 78, at 32; Daniel Jutras, ClinicalPracticeGuidelinesas Legal Norms, 148 CMAJ 905,
908 (1993).
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products liability does not apply where injury arises as a result of the words or
ideas within a book, pamphlet, brochure, or similar product.124 As the Ninth
Circuit wrote in Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, "We place a high priority on the
unfettered exchange of ideas .... The threat of liability without fault could
seriously inhibit those who wish to share thoughts and theories."' 2 5
An obvious alternative would be for the plaintiff to bring suit under a
theory of negligent misrepresentation. According to the Second Restatement of
Torts, a defendant will be liable for negligent misrepresentation if he "negligently
gives false information to another" and such information causes physical harm to
that person or to a foreseeable third party.'2 6 Negligence is defined as the failure to
exercise reasonable care in "ascertaining the accuracy of the information," or "the
manner in which it is communicated."' Under this definition, then, decision-aid
creators who negligently provide false information, or negligently communicate
information in a manner giving a "misleading impression,"' 28 may be liable to
patients who are thereby harmed.129 However, the actual prospects for liability

124.
See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991)
(declining to expand products liability law to embrace the ideas and expression in a book);
Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (bookseller's strict
liability limited to the physical properties of books, binding, and printing, not the material
communicated); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983)
(finding no case law to support strict liability for the content of a magazine or other

publication as a product within the meaning of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (noting no appellate court in
any jurisdiction has held a book to be a product for purposes of section 402A).
938 F.2d 1033, 1034-35 (affirming district court's grant of summary
125.
judgment to defendant, publisher of a mushroom encyclopedia that allegedly caused
plaintiffs collection and ingestion of toxic mushrooms). The only situation in which
defendants have been held strictly liable for harms to readers is in cases involving "charts
which graphically depict geographic features or instrument approaches for airplanes."
Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035 (citing Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676, 679 (2d
Cir. 1983) (holding that aeronautical charts classified as products were grounds for strict
liability)). In Winter, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly distinguished cases
involving aeronautical charts from those involving "how-to books." 938 F.2d at 1035-36.
126.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).
127.
Id.

128.
Id. at cmt. e, illus. 9.
Many courts have held that section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
129.
does not apply to those who merely publish false information. See Smith, 563 A.2d at 126;
Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1266-67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985);
MacKown v. Ill. Publ'g & Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526, 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937) (a publisher
is not liable for physical injuries resulting from the procedures it publishes). Rather, a
publisher will be liable for negligent misrepresentation only if he also authored or otherwise
guaranteed the information. Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publ'ns, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 75
(Haw. 1992) ("It appears from a review of relevant case law that no jurisdiction has held a
publisher liable in negligence for personal injury suffered in reliance upon information
contained in the publication, unless the publisher authored or guaranteed the information.");
see also Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 283 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (applying this rule
in a products liability context). In the case of decision-aid creators, of course, the publisher,
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under a theory of negligent misrepresentation are extremely unlikely for two
significant reasons.
First, courts adjudicating negligent misrepresentation claims typically
require that the plaintiff demonstrate privity with the defendant.1 30 Where the
misrepresented information has been circulated to consumers or the general
public,13 ' however, few courts are willing to find privity. Authors of printed
materials aimed at the general public have consistently been found to owe no duty
of care to readers, even where the material provides instructions and information
about improving one's health.132 In Roman v. City of New York, for example,
plaintiffs brought a negligent misrepresentation claim against Planned Parenthood
on the basis of faulty information provided in a booklet she was given at her
physician's office.133 The court found no duty on the part of Planned Parenthood,
noting that the defendant "pointedly intended the booklet to provide information to
the general public, including plaintiff, and the fact that it could have reasonably
foreseen plaintiffs reliance thereon, does not change the result. ... [T]he
relational duty sufficient to give rise to a cause of action in negligent
misrepresentation is not present."l 34 Based on this precedent, it is unlikely that a
company that creates decision aids for use by medical consumers would be found
to owe a duty of care to the users of these decision aids under existing tort law,
unless the circumstances indicated some special relationship that would support a
finding of privity. That said, in cases where a plaintiff is able to prove that a
author, and guarantor are one and the same; thus, a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation would be applicable.
130.
In contrast, third parties who guarantee or endorse the quality of a product
may be found liable for negligent misrepresentation if a plaintiff is injured as a result of a
defect in that product, even in the absence of privity. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal.
Rptr. 519, 523 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding that plaintiff successfully pled a cause of action
against Good Housekeeping for issuing its Consumers' Guaranty Seal to a pair of defective
shoes).
131.
See, e.g., First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 670 F. Supp.
115, 116, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (declining to find the publisher of Corporation Records
liable even though "[t]he defendant tout[ed] the reliability" of its publication, noting that:
"It is one thing to say that the defendant extols the virtues of its publication.... It is quite
another to say that it anywhere assumes responsibility for 100 percent accuracy.").
132.
See, e.g., Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying negligent misrepresentation claim for relying on a diet education
book); Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic Ctr., 952 P.2d 768, 771, 773 (Colo. App. 1997)
(finding that a dentist who wrote a book encouraging removal of dental amalgams owed no
duty of care to members of the public who read the book).
There have been few cases in which readers have sought to recover
based upon statements made by authors, and none has been discovered
that has allowed recovery, except in those instances in which the
publication was intended to be used as a "product." In all other instances,
in light of First Amendment implications, it has been concluded that no
duty of due care is owed by an author to a reader.
Id. at 773 (internal citation omitted).
133.
442 N.Y.S.2d 945, 948 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
134.
Id
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decision-aid creator's misrepresentation or bias was intentional, she might recover
on traditional negligence grounds, and privity would not be an issue.' 35
The second, and more intractable, barrier to tort recovery for victims of
faulty decision aids (whether on grounds of negligence or negligent
misrepresentation) is the problem of proving causation. In order to succeed on a
traditional negligence-based claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate causation in factnamely, the plaintiff would not have been injured had the defendant acted
reasonably. However, in negligence claims based on failure of informed consent,
this standard is modified. Causation in informed consent cases is judged by an
objective standard, whereby the plaintiff must prove that the "reasonable patient"
would have declined the procedure (or chosen a different procedure) had the
defendant accurately disclosed its risks.'1 6
This brings us to the problem of causation in claims for injuries suffered
as a result of faulty decision aids. By definition, decision-support tools are used
primarily for preference-sensitive medical decisions-that is, decisions as between
multiple clinically viable options. The very nature of preference-sensitive medical
decisions is that it is impossible to predict what a "reasonable patient" would
choose. For example, for women with a family history of breast cancer and the
BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes, proph4 lactic mastectomy and "watchful waiting" are
both legitimate clinical options.' 3 Depending on their values, patients may have
different opinions about which treatment is best for them. In such a situation,
because of the value-based nature of the decision, few plaintiffs would be able to
135.
The tort of "intentional misrepresentation" is not applicable in this context,
as it is used almost exclusively where misrepresentation leads to commercial rather than
physical harm. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 469, at 1343 (2000). Where intentional
misrepresentation instead leads to physical injury, the underlying act of "misrepresentation"
tends to be subsumed by the resulting (intentional or negligent) tort. Id.; see also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTs § 104, at 725-26 (5th ed. 1984) ("A great
many of the common and familiar forms of negligent conduct, resulting in invasions of
tangible interests of person or property, are in their essence nothing more than
misrepresentation.. . . [In such cases,] misrepresentation has been merged to such an extent
with other kinds of misconduct that neither the courts nor legal writers have found any
occasion to regard it as a separate basis of liability."); and infra Part V.C.
136.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d. 772, 786-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also
Peter H. Schuck, supra note 27, at 919. This objective element of the causation claim is
referred to as "decision causation." A plaintiff in an informed consent case must also prove
"injury causation"-namely, that the undisclosed risk actually caused the plaintiffs injury.
Id. at 918-19; Evelyn Tenenbaum, Revitalizing Informed Consent and Protecting Patient
Autonomy: An Appeal to Abandon Objective Causation, 64 OKLA. L. REv. (forthcoming

2012) (on file with author).
See, e.g., Victor R. Grann et al., Decision Analysis of Prophylactic
137.
Mastectomy and Oophorectomy in BRCA1-Positive or BRCA2-Positive Patients, 16 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 979 (1998); Ellen S. Tambor et al., Should Women at Increased Risk
for Breast and Ovarian Cancer Be Randomized to Prophylactic Surgery? An Ethical and
EmpiricalAssessment, 9 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH & GENDER-BASED MED. 223 (2000); Peter A.
Ubel, "What Should I Do, Doc? ": Some Psychologic Benefits of Physician
Recommendations, 162 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 977 (2002).
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prove that a reasonable patient faced with accurate and unbiased information about
both options would have made a different choice. If a medical decision is
challenging precisely because there are reasonable differences of opinion about the
best treatment option, a patient harmed as a result of misinformation during this
decision will have great difficulty satisfying the causation element of the claim."'
A final point worth noting is that some of the flaws we are likely to see in
decision-support tools may not fall squarely within the definition of negligence or
negligent misrepresentation. While it may be easy to prove that factual information
included in a decision aid is incorrect or outdated, patients alleging bias or
misrepresentation may have more difficulty convincing a jury that such bias rises
to the level of negligent misrepresentation or fraud. For example, although studies
clearly establish that presenting risk in absolute, rather than relative, terms is more
effective when communicating information to patients,139 a jury may be unwilling
to impose liability based on a difference in framing. That said, the Restatement
Second of Torts suggests that negligence in providing information may include not
only "false information," but also the manner in which the information is
communicated.140 And in the rare case where a plaintiff is able to demonstrate
intentional use of framing effects or other cognitive biases by the decision-aid
creator, recovery for subsequent physical harm could be obtained on traditional
negligence grounds, as described above.
IV. THE SPECTRUM FROM REGULATION TO TORT LAW:
FACTORS TO CONSIDER
Administrative regulation and tort liability are the primary mechanisms
by which American law serves to protect the public from potentially harmful
products and activities. Administrative agencies establish ex ante standards with
which industries and professions are required to comply to minimize public risk. If
consumer injury nevertheless occurs as a result of an entity's failure to satisfy the
appropriate standard of care, ex post tort liability may then be used to compensate
individuals for their pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. Regulation and tort are
often viewed as complementary systems, with tort liability picking up where
administrative regulation leaves off.141
138.
See, e.g., Evelyn Tenenbaum, Presentation at the ASLME's 34th Annual
Health Law Professors Conference: The Causation Element of Informed Consent and Why
Current Trends in Health Care Support the Need for Change (June 10, 2011).
139.
Alex Barratt, Presenting Probabilities, in IPDAS COLLABORATION
BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 11, 13 (Annette O'Connor et al. eds., Feb. 17, 2005), availableat
ipdas.ohri.ca/IPDASBackground.pdf.
140.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 cmt. e (1965) ("The negligence for
which the actor is liable under the statement in this Subsection consists in the lack of
reasonable care to firnish accurate information. It is, therefore, not enough that the actor has
correctly ascertained the facts on which his information is to be based and has exercised
reasonable competence in judging the effect of such facts. He must also exercise reasonable
care to bring to the understanding of the recipient of the information the knowledge which
he has so acquired.").
141.
See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 21, at 1.
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When ordering professional and industrial behavior, policy-makers can
choose among a variety of options within the wide spectrum between exclusively
regulatory regimes and tort regimes; as is often the case, most situations fall
somewhere in the middle. The choice of where on this spectrum a given situation
should fall can be viewed as a decision about who is in the best position to define
and enforce the standard of care-an administrative agency or a court.14 2 Where
policy-makers decide that the standard of care should hew closely to an agency's
determination, they may explicitly or implicitly preempt state tort actions that
would impose additional requirements above and beyond those established by
regulations. Similar goals can be achieved using the doctrine of regulatory
compliance, 143 which states that defendants' compliance with duly enacted
regulations is a defense in tort actions and effectively prohibits courts from
second-guessing agency decisions relating to the standard of care. In other
contexts, however, policy-makers may leave open the possibility of using tort law
to complement existing regulatory requirements.144
Decisions about where on this spectrum a given case should fall are
inherently challenging, 145 and it can be unclear why policy-makers choose to
preempt tort liability in some cases but not others. Thankfully, a surfeit of recent
academic work in this area has been helpful in clarifying the benefits of each
approach and in elucidating some of the reasons why policy-makers might choose
one over another.146 This Part builds upon prior scholarship by identifying five
142.

Hylton, supra note 21, at 212 (2008); Rabin, supra note 21, at 2061.

143.
See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient PharmaceuticalLitigation:
An Economic Rationalefor the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL. L.
REv. 1437, 1463-64(1994).

144.
Such contexts include pharmaceutical and environmental regulation. See
infra text accompanying notes 156-61.
145.
Occasionally, Congress clarifies its expectations by including express
preemption language in a statute authorizing agency regulation. However, more often than
not, statutory grants of agency authority do not include clear and unambiguous directives
with respect to the preemption of tort claims. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574
(2008) ("If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it surely
would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCA's 70year history. But ... Congress has not.. . ."); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166 (1989) ("Both the law of unfair competition and state trade secret
law have coexisted harmoniously with federal patent protection for almost 200 years, and
Congress has given no indication that their operation is inconsistent with the operation of
the federal patent laws."). Accordingly, judges and agency officials are frequently charged
with determining whether Congress intended to establish a purely regulatory regime or
whether individuals injured as a result of regulatory violations ought to be permitted to
bring tort claims for recovery.
146.
See, e.g., Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public
Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 277-78 (1985) (distinguishing
between public and private risks); Hylton, supra note 21, at 211-14 (considering error cost
in determining whether preemption is appropriate); Nagareda, supra note 21, at 8-37
(identifying situations in which we might be more confident in regulatory approaches than
tort approaches); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollarsand Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
537 (2005) (highlighting differences between tort law and administrative law); Rabin, supra
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factors1 47 that ought to be considered in determining whether a primarily
regulatory system or one incorporating substantial tort remedies is more
appropriate to a given context. 148 Then, this Part evaluates each of these factors as
applied to patient decision aids. It concludes that while there is a great deal of
uncertainty about whether the regulations contemplated by PPACA would be
sufficient to control the creation of decision aids, many of these factors weigh in
favor of a complementary tort regime.

A. Remedies, Compensation, and Deterrence
The principal difference between regulatory and tort approaches is that
the tort system, unlike administrative regulation, has as one of its primary concerns
the compensation of individuals who have been harmed. 149 Regulatory regimes, in
contrast, are typically aimed at setting comprehensive standards that efficiently
balance costs and benefits at a more global level, rather than rectifying individual
harms. Accordingly, policy-makers' perceptions of the likelihood of individual
harm as well as their opinions about the need for victim compensation in light of
existing regulations are likely to influence decisions about which system is more
appropriate in a given context. Where some of the compensatory goals of tort law
are already satisfied by a regulatory regime-either through a no-fault
note 21, at 2050 (discussing the risks and benefits of the regulatory compliance defense);
Viscusi, supra note 21, at 67-71 (highlighting the risks and benefits of market-based
approaches, tort law, social insurance, and regulation in controlling risks). The wealth of
recent work on this topic may be the result of recent trends toward elimination of tort
remedies in favor of administrative regimes. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme
Court'sAssault on Litigation: Why (andHow) It Might Be GoodforHealth Law, 90 B.U. L.

REv. 2323, 2382 (2010).
147.
This list of five factors is by no means exhaustive. Additional factors that
may affect decisions about whether to adopt a primarily regulatory regime or one
supplemented with tort liability include: the degree of conflict between regulatory and
common law requirements, Hylton, supra note 21, at 217; the comparative administrative
costs of each approach, id at 212-13; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 146, at 540-42; the
importance of predictability, Hylton, supra note 21, at 213-14; and the relative values of
agency expertise and local knowledge. Id at 214. I have not included them in the list of five
essential factors in part because they may not be applicable to every situation, whereas the
five factors described herein tend to be relevant for all policy decisions in this arena. For
example, where common law requirements are unclear or regulatory requirements have not
been established, it is impossible to analyze the degree of conflict between the two.
Moreover, the five factors I selected are those that tend to be analyzed most frequently by
courts and commentators.
148.
Although policy-makers may not engage in a formalistic analysis of each of
these five factors when making such decisions, scholars of administrative and tort law
consistently recognize the salience of these characteristics to legislatures' and courts'
reasoning. See supra note 146. There is, moreover, no single way of calculating which of
these factors is most important in a given context; most authors simply refer to a "weighing"
or "balancing" approach. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 21, at 214.
Rabin, supra note 21, at 2073 ("Regulatory agencies are not in the business
149.
of compensating for accidental harm arising from activities within the ambit of their
authority.").
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compensation system' 50 or some other remedy' 1 '-policy-makers may determine
that additional victim recovery is unnecessary and provide for complete or partial
preemption of tort suits.152 The most notable example of a broad preemptive
regime in the medical context is that of medical devices, which are heavily
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") pursuant to the Medical
Device Amendments ("MDA") of 1976.153 In Riegel v. Medtronic, the Supreme
Court held that federal regulations completely preempt the possibility of state tort
claims against device manufacturers for defective design, manufacturing, or
labeling of devices that have been approved through the FDA's pre-market
approval process.154 Injured patients do, however, have a right to pursue claims
against medical device manufacturers for violating FDA regulations-for example,
if their product deviates from the specifications provided during pre-market
approval. 55 In essence, policy-makers have determined that the MDA's
protections are enough to protect consumers and that consumers will have a
150.
For example, the federal public health statute establishing the National
Vaccine Program also establishes a National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
("NVICP"). 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2012). The NVICP enables individuals with
vaccine-related injuries to obtain remedies through a no-fault compensation system or,
under certain circumstances, to pursue civil actions. Id.
An example of this is in the context of ERISA, which regulates employee
151.
benefit plans, including health benefit plans. ERISA grants beneficiaries an affirmative right
to sue in federal court to recover benefits due under a plan, enforce rights under the terms of
a plan, or clarify rights to future benefits. Although beneficiaries are precluded under
ERISA from recovering most monetary damages resulting from a claim denial, Congress
has determined that the statutory remedies described above are sufficient. Accordingly, state
tort suits against most health plans and providers are completely preempted to the extent
they seek to recover the remedies already granted by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012);
Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 200-01 (2004); see John D. Shire, Comment,
Varity Corp. v. Howe in the Wake of Martens v. Hewitt Associates: Did the Supreme Court
Impermissibly Authorize a Damages Award Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3)(B)?, 102 DICK.

L. REv. 411, 438 (1998) ("The issue whether ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B) authorizes
damages is unsettled. . .. Nonetheless, while consequential damages are not authorized
under section 502(a)(3)(B), direct damages should be available under that
section.... Damage awards outside of the benefits due under the express terms of the plan
are extracontractual and should not be recoverable."); see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) ("All that ERISA has eliminated, on these assumptions, is the
common law's joint and several liability, for all direct and consequential damages
suffered . . . ."). ERISA's treatment of victim injury makes plain that the extent to which
victims are able to recover is dependent on how their rights are legally defined and that
narrowly defined rights may offer consumers only limited opportunities for recovery.
152.
Note that a variety of other factors also play into the preemption decision,
most notably the degree of congruence between regulatory and common-law requirements.
See Hylton, supra note 21, at 217.
Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c153.
360k (2012)).
552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008). Medical devices that have been exempted from
154.
the pre-market approval process under Section 510(k) of the MDA are, however, still
vulnerable to state tort suits. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 493-94 (1996).
155.
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.
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satisfactory remedy if they are injured as a result of a manufacturer's failure to
comply with federal regulations.
The regulation of pharmaceuticals, in contrast, is an example of a system
that falls more toward the tort side of the spectrum. In Wyeth v. Levine, the
Supreme Court held that consumers may bring state law failure-to-warn suits
against pharmaceutical companies, even if the drug labeling was approved by the
FDA.1 56 In interpreting Congress's intent in drafting the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act ("FDCA"), the Court determined that consumers will be inadequately
protected and inadequately compensated if they are only permitted to sue drug
manufacturers for regulatory non-compliance.' 7 Thus, in pharmaceutical cases,
judges and juries are given the opportunity to "second-guess" agency
determinations about the appropriate balance between risks and benefits. We see a
similar approach in the context of environmental regulations, which generally do
not provide a compensatory remedy for individual injuries' 5 8 and have long been
viewed as insufficient for public protection. 5 9 Indeed, the prevalence of
environmental tort suits has increased over the past few decades 60 in part due to
the growing recognition that civil liability is a "necessary complement" to
regulation from the perspective of victim compensation.161
Accordingly, the first questions we should ask when deciding between
primarily regulatory and primarily tort-based regimes are: (1) whether individual
consumers are likely to be harmed by a regulatory violation (or by a faulty
regulation itself); and (2) if so, whether the regulation in question offers a
sufficient opportunity for a compensatory remedy, while taking into account
deterrence. If the likelihood of consumer harm is high and the regulation does not
provide a satisfactory individual remedy, a complementary tort regime may be
necessary.

156.
555 U.S. 555, 575-76 (2008).
157.
Id.
158.
See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and
Environmental Regulation: An Analytical Overview, 41 WAsHBuRN L.J. 379, 382 (2002);
Peter Cane, Using Tort Law to Enforce EnvironmentalRegulations, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 427,

452 (2002). However, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), does allow injunctive remedies and recovery of costs
for individual injuries. Abraham, supra note 158, at 386-88.
159.

See Abraham, supra note 158, at 391.
Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1993)
(describing environmental torts as increasing, and "informed .. . by environmental
regulation"); Sheila G Bush, Can You Get There from Here?: Noncompliance with
Environmental Regulations as Negligence Per Se in Tort Cases, 25 IDAHO L. REv. 469

160.

(1988) (describing a "recent frenzy of toxic tort litigation"). But see Albert C. Lin, Beyond
Tort: Compensating Victims ofEnvironmental Toxic Injury, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 144142 (2004) (arguing that tort law leaves many victims of environmental torts uncompensated,

in part due to the difficulties of proving causation); Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the
Translation: What Environmental Regulation Does that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 583, 589 (2001) (same).

161.

Abraham, supra note 158, at 379.
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In the case of patient decision aids, the possibility of consumer injury is
significant, for the reasons outlined in Part II. Since there are currently no legal
restrictions on the creation or distribution of decision aids and no obvious
opportunities for tort recovery, consumers' compensatory goals are not being well
served. Thus, in order to ensure that injured parties have some remedy, policymakers in this area have two options-either they could draft regulations for the
creation and use of patient decision aids that provide some compensatory remedy
or they could leave the issue of compensation to tort law. Let us consider each of
these options in turn.
PPACA requires that HHS contract with an entity that will develop
"consensus-based standards"' 62 for decision-support tools and establish a
certification process. It remains to be seen to what extent HHS regulations will
guide this standard-setting, but it seems reasonable to assume that HHS will
provide, at the very least, general directives about the goals patient decision aids
ought to satisfy to be consistent with PPACA.'6 1 If faulty decision aids result
despite these precautions, whether because HHS has not provided sufficient
guidance to or oversight of the contracting entity, or because decision-aid creators
have failed to comply with the standards, patients are likely to be injured.
A regulatory approach to remedying such injury might provide a federal
remedy to parties injured by regulatory non-compliance. Alternatively, it might
seek to establish, with Congress's approval, a no-fault compensation system for
patients injured by faulty decision aids. No-fault systems, like workers'
compensation and the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, provide
injured parties with the opportunity to receive compensation through
administrative means, without having to bring a tort case in court or prove liability
on the part of a defendant. The primary benefit of such systems is the efficiency
and uniformity of their administration. Victims can resolve their claims more
quickly and easily than they would through the tort system, and potential
defendants need not fear bankruptcy as a result of a groundswell of tort suits.' 64
No-fault compensation systems are particularly useful where victims might have
65
difficulty proving fault under traditional theories of causation.'
Establishing such a program, however, is likely to be extremely difficult
in the context of decision-support tools. The most significant challenge relates to
the fact that establishing a no-fault system requires a solid financial foundation that
is unlikely to be found in the context of patient decision aids. Existing no-fault
programs-like worker's compensation, Florida's Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Plan,' 6 the National Vaccine Injury Compensation

162.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3506,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(c)(1)(A) (2012)).
163.
See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(d)(1)(B).
164.
Randall R Bovbjerg et al., Administrative Performance of "No-Fault"
Compensationfor Medical Injury, 60 L. &CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 74-75 (1997).
165.
Id. at 72.

166.

Established by FLA.

STAT.

§766.303 (2012).
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Program,1 67 and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund16 8 -are funded by
the parties who would most likely be defendants in associated tort suits. Generally,
no-fault programs are established only where the entities contributing premiums or
funds to the programs (e.g., employers, physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and
airline carriers) are significant in number or otherwise well funded. A no-fault
system of compensation for victims of faulty decision aids, in contrast, would need
to be funded by the creators and marketers of decision aids, a much shallower
pool. The market for patient decision aids has only recently developed, and until a
critical mass of well-funded entities begin participating in the creation and
distribution of patient decision aids, it is difficult to see how a no-fault system
would be funded.
Moreover, most no-fault programs are established to compensate only for
unavoidable harms-that is, situations where no degree of due care could prevent
the injury in question.169 The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund is a
prime example-victims of this disaster would likely have suffered harms even if
the airline industry had taken every step reasonably possible to prevent terrorist
attacks. Likewise, the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program recognizes
that some vaccine-related injuries are simply unavoidable. In contrast, harms
arising from faulty decision aids seem clearly traceable to fault or negligence on
the part of decision-aid creators.170 Finally, according to some commentators, the
model of no-fault compensation as a whole is slowly going the way of the
dinosaur.' 7 ' For the practical and policy reasons described above, few, if any, nofault programs have been created in the past few years. It would be highly unusual,
then, to establish a no-fault system for compensating victims of faulty decision
aids, particularly where their harms are clearly traceable to a defendant's
negligence and could conceivably have been prevented.
The alternative, then, is to provide a tort remedy to injured patients under
traditional negligence principles. For the reasons outlined in Part III.B, however,
the tort system as it currently exists is not well equipped to resolve disputes arising
from faulty decision aids. To prove liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate privity
Established by 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2012).
167.
168.
Established by Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2012)).
169.
David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for
Medical Injuries, 286 JAMA217, 220 (2001).

170.
Other criticisms of no-fault systems may be relevant as well. For example,
many argue that no-fault compensation systems are ineffective due to their limited deterrent
effect. Because potential defendants are not forced to absorb financial losses directly, they
may have less incentive to exercise due care in their business. See Arlen, supra note 20, at
1116; Studdert & Brennan, supra note 169, at 220-21. But see Randall R. Bovbjerg &
Frank A. Sloan, No-Faultfor Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 53,
at 71-72 (1998) ("[C]ompensation should be improved through no-fault because periodic
payment of benefits provides a form of insurance protection against unanticipated changes
in needs.").
171.
See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for NoFault'sDemise, 61 DEPAUL L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author).

HeinOnline -- 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 654 2012

PATIENT PROTECTION

2012]

655

with the defendant; to date, courts have been unwilling to find privity where an
author or publisher provides information aimed at the general public. Moreover,
because decision aids are targeted to situations where a patient is choosing
between multiple reasonable options, an injured patient would have difficulty
demonstrating causation under current informed consent doctrine. In order to
provide plaintiffs with a tort remedy, policy-makers would need to resolve the two
problems described above, and furthermore clarify that the legislation and
regulations relating to decision-support tools do not preempt tort liability.
It seems that either option for recovery-an administrative system for
compensating injured patients or a traditional tort regime-has its difficulties
(some of which will be addressed in further detail in Part V). The analysis above
does not clearly favor one approach over another. Thus, approaching the issue
from the perspective of compensation may not help resolve the decision of whether
regulation alone or a complementary tort law approach are best suited for
controlling decision-support tools.
B. Nature of Risk
The above discussion of compensation reinforces the need, in many cases,
to provide remedies to individuals who are harmed as a result of industry failures.
Whether compensation is appropriate is, of course, influenced in part by the nature
of the risks expected to occur despite the presence of regulation.
Typically, tort law is viewed as an effective means of dealing with
"private risks," whereby specific acts of negligence cause individualized harms. 1 72
In contrast, purely regulatory mechanisms are aimed at "public risks"-namely,
those that arise inevitably from the operation of beneficial industries and cause
generalized risks that may or may not manifest themselves in individual injury. 173
Peter Huber, who has argued against the expansion of tort liability in areas with
already robust regulatory regimes, cites as prime examples of "public risks" those
arising from "vaccines, pesticides, aircraft, power plants, and the like."l 74 While
contemporary law does in fact permit individuals to bring claims for compensation
in many of these contexts, the distinction between inevitable public harm and
preventable private harm is instructive when determining how best to protect
consumers.
Consider, for example, the law's approach to two very different types of
medical regulation. Medical practice is governed by a vast set of regulations,
including federal conditions of participation under Medicare and Medicaid, as well
as state medical board requirements. Despite these mandatory standards, it is
widely acknowledged that injuries caused by medical negligence vary significantly
on a case-by-case basis, and cannot be prevented by generalized rules that do not
take into account the particularities of an individual physician-patient

172.
173.

Rabin, supra note 21, at 2052.
Id.; see also Moncrieff, supra note 146, at 2332 (discussing whether a

regulation confers individual rights, or just enforces a general scheme).

174.

Huber, supra note 146, at 334.
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interaction. 175 In contrast, the regulation of faulty medical devices, which are more
fungible in nature, appears to be aimed at finding a balance between fostering
innovation while at the same time preventing public risks. Congress has therefore
determined that a regulatory regime is more appropriate to control the risks arising
from medical devices; accordingly, state tort suits for victim compensation are
fully preempted.176
Judged by reference to unavoidable "public injuries" versus potentially
preventable "private injuries," decision-support tools appear much better suited to
an approach that complements regulation with tort liability. When a decisionsupport tool provides incorrect or biased information, the injury suffered by a
patient is individualized in nature. The best analogy may be to traditional medical
malpractice: state medical licensing boards and federal agencies establish
standards for competent physician practice in part because the risks of negligent
practice affect individuals in very different ways. Any determination of whether a
physician acted inappropriately will depend on the facts of the case; such harms
cannot be effectively remedied by a one-size-fits-all regulatory system.
Likewise, the injury suffered by a patient who is provided with a faulty
decision aid is also a very personalized injury. Imagine that a patient uses a faulty
decision aid to choose Treatment B over Treatment A, both of which are clinically
appropriate options for her condition. The patient is consequently injured as a
result of her choice to proceed with Treatment B. The nature of her injury may be
very different in kind from the injury suffered by another patient in a similar
situation-there are a variety of ways in which Treatment B could go wrong.
Moreover, not every patient will end up choosing Treatment B over Treatment A,
and many patients who choose Treatment B will not suffer any injury as a result.
Given the variability of the injuries that might arise from the use of faulty decision
aids, a purely regulatory approach that protects against somewhat fungible public
harms seems suboptimal.
Furthermore, the kinds of public risks that are typically addressed with a
purely regulatory approach tend to be deemed, as noted above, inevitable
consequences of even the most carefully regulated industries. Regulations in the
airline, automobile, manufacturing, and hazardous materials industries, for
example, are drafted to strike an appropriate balance between industry efficiency
and public safety. Regulators are acutely aware of the fact that consumers will be
injured even with the exercise of due care, and they consider the risk of these
injuries acceptable in light of the overall benefits that accrue to society as a
whole.'" While policy-makers may view medical regulations as attempting to
strike a similar balance, the public perception of medical practice is very different
indeed. Atul Gawande describes Western medical practice as "dominated by a
175.

See Moncrieff, supra note 146, at 2346 (citing CMS and board discipline as

being ineffective in addressing medical errors and malpractice).
176.
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008).
The distinction between inevitable and preventable injuries is also reflected
177.
in policy approaches towards no-fault compensation. See supra note 169 and accompanying
text.
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single imperative-the quest for machinelike perfection in the delivery of care.
When a patient is injured, she does not consider her injuries inevitable
consequences of a complex system; rather, she may explain her injuries by finding
fault in individual healthcare providers and institutions and may pursue medical
malpractice claims to recover for what she considers to be a very personal and
unique harm. Faulty decision-support tools, as part of the healthcare process, are
likely to be viewed similarly and so will require some targeted mechanism for
recovery that would not be available under a pure regulatory regime.
C Regulatory Specificity and Comprehensiveness

Decisions about where a particular issue should lie on the spectrum
between pure regulation and tort are influenced in large part by the details of
existing or proposed regulations. Policy-makers are more likely to find a
regulatory regime sufficient when it directly addresses contemplated harms, sets
optimal standards for industry conduct, and is mandatory in nature.
Typically, if a regulation does not contemplate or address a given
problem, it will not prevent injured parties from seeking alternative forms of
recovery. 179 An instructive example can be found in the context of pharmaceutical
safety. When the FDA grants pre-market approval for marketing and distribution
of a drug, it does so only for the particular conditions and populations that were
evaluated in clinical trials. The FDA has no control over "off-label" usage,
whereby a physician prescribes a drug for a condition or to a patient for whom the
drug has not been deemed safe and effective.o8 0 Because the FDCA does not
regulate the risks arising from off-label usage, it is common to see tort law being
used to fill in these gaps.' 1 In contrast, had the FDA retained authority for
controlling "off-label" usage, it is less likely that courts would permit consumers
injured by off-label uses to turn to the tort system for compensation.182
Whether a regulation is comprehensive-that is, whether it establishes
both a floor and a ceiling for industry conduct-also has an impact on these
178.

ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT
37 (2003).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 (1998)
179.

SCIENCE

(establishing that regulatory compliance may be a successful defense in a tort action if the
regulation specifically addresses particular type of harm). Another situation in which
complementary tort liability may be appropriate is when it addresses a risk that does not call
into question the agency's regulatory expertise or discretion-for example, cases where
plaintiffs are injured as a result of an entity's fraud on the agency. Id. at cmt. e.
See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use: Rethinking the Role
180.
of the FDA, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008).
181.

See, e.g., Knipe v. SmithKline Beecham, 583 F. Supp. 2d 602, 624-25 (E.D.

Pa. 2008) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs allegations of
off-label promotion); United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 403 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)

(denying defendant's motion to dismiss as to drug sales representative for alleged
misbranding of a drug for off-label uses).
182.

See Viscusi et al., supra note 143, at 1478 (noting that where the FDA has

made "an explicit judgment" on an issue, tort liability should be preempted).
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decisions. Policy-makers recognize that regulations that merely set minimum
benchmarks (or that are voluntary rather than mandatory) may not be sufficient to
protect consumers from harm. In Wyeth v. Levine, for example, the Supreme Court
held that Congress had not preempted state law failure-to-warn claims in the
pharmaceutical context, finding that the FDA "cast federal labeling standards as a
floor upon which States could build and repeatedly disclaimed any attempt to preempt failure-to-warn claims."' 8 3 Similarly, in the environmental context,
compliance with federal regulations typically does not protect defendants from suit
under more stringent state standards.184 Where, instead, regulations set optimal
standards (in effect, defining the standard of care) that are mandatory for an
industry, supplementing them with additional tort liability may be inefficient.' 8 5
As noted in the introduction to this Part, it is difficult to reach any firm
conclusion with respect to the certification of patient decision aids as contemplated
by PPACA because the regulations associated with this provision have not yet
been drafted. That said, history suggests that they will likely be voluntary
regulations setting a floor for quality, in which case supplemental tort liability may
be needed to bridge the gap between what is adequate and what is optimal.
In terms of regulatory aims, the general purpose behind PPACA's
proposal to certify decision aids is to ensure some degree of standardization and
quality in an effort to protect patient users. 186 The details of the certification
process are still unknown, but the text of PPACA suggests that considerations of
accuracy and impartiality will be paramount. In a provision about grants to entities
that develop and test decision aids, the statute refers to testing of decision aids to
ensure that they are "balanced and evidence based"' 8 7 and reflect "the varying
needs of consumers [from a variety of cultural and educational backgrounds] and
diverse levels of health literacZ."' 8 8 The statutory references to "consensus,"' 89
"balance[],"' 90 and "evidence"' 1 strongly suggest that Congress was aware of the
possibility of misinformation or bias and intended to direct regulators to address

183.
555 U.S. 555, 577-78 (2009).
184.
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1582 (2007) (noting that federal
environmental regulations, among others, are "typically construed as merely setting a

minimum requirement or floor [and] leave room for nonconflicting state action and tort suit
conclusions that the standard of care is greater than the one approved by federal actors.");
Paul S. Weiland, Federal andState Preemption ofEnvironmentalLaw: A CriticalAnalysis,
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 237, 282 (2000) (citing the "Floor-not-Ceiling Model" as having

been "expressly adopted by Congress in numerous federal environmental laws.").
185.
See Viscusi et al., supra note 143, at 1478.
186.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 3506, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-31(c)(2) (2012)).
187.
Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(d)(1)(B)).
Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(d)(2)(B)).
188.

189.
190.

Id (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(c)(1)(A), (2)(A)).
Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(d)(1)(B)).

191.

Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§ 299b-36(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(2)(A),

(d)(1)(B3)).
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these issues in the certification process. If they are able to do so successfully, there
may be less need for a supplemental compensatory program.
Based on the nature of the product being regulated, it seems clear that any
contemplated regulations would merely establish minimum benchmarks that
decision-support tools must satisfy, rather than set a ceiling on their quality. If
these regulations are viewed as a floor upon which states may build, then they are
unlikely to be the exclusive form of recourse for injured consumers. And as to
whether the administrative standards established for decision-support tools will be
voluntary or mandatory, it seems very unlikely that the certification process would
be mandatory. A number of factors lead to this conclusion. First, given that
decision-support tools have, thus far, operated in an environment with no
regulations at all, implementing a mandatory certification system will be difficult.
Second, any proposal for mandatory certification is likely to be opposed by the
entities that create decision-support tools and potentially even by the physician
community, which has been notoriously slow in adopting mechanisms for
standardizing care. Finally, given that the practice of medicine is traditionally
regulated by states pursuant to their police powers, implementing a system of
mandatory federal certification may be difficult, particularly in situations where
state agencies are the ones creating and publishing decision-support tools. If, as
suggested herein, it is unlikely that a certification process for patient decision aids
will be mandatory, then a supplementary tort remedy may be necessary, even if
federal regulations aim specifically at addressing these types of harms.
D. Information
Another significant difference between regulatory and tort law regimes is
the manner in which they collect and take advantage of information about public
risks and benefits. Accordingly, the informational characteristics of regulatory and
tort law regimes are likely to influence policy-makers' decisions.
At their best, administrative regulations are based on comprehensive
research about the industry to be regulated and its impact on the public. For
example, environmental regulations are set only after thorough investigation of the
safety of various levels of environmental pollutants, the cost of requiring industries
to limit environmental contamination (or to remediate existing contamination), and
the number of individuals affected.1 92 In contrast, the information collected in tort
suits is primarily aimed at proving individual causation after an injury has already
occurred; indeed, the tort system is often criticized for its reliance on potentially
biased expert testimony and anecdotal (rather than systematic) evidence.193
That said, there are legitimate criticisms of the regulatory system's
approach to information. First, some regulatory agencies may be subject to
"capture" by industry influences, resulting in a system that is industry-friendly,

192.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2012); EPA Innocent Landowners, Standards for
Conducting All Appropriate Inquiries, 40 C.F.R pt. 312 (2012).
See, e.g., PETER WILLIAM HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE INTHE
193.
COURTROOM 204 (1991).
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rather than neutral and unbiased.194 Second, the regulatory system may not be
flexible enough to accommodate rapidly changing evidence in developing fields.
The FDA, for example, has been widely criticized for failing to monitor post95
market drug safety as new data about patient injuries arises.' Tort law, on the
96
other hand, may be able to respond somewhat more quickly to changing data'
and often serves as an effective means for circulating new information to the
public.197

The informational characteristics of regulatory and tort law are therefore
relevant to policy-makers' decisions. Policy-makers may be more willing to rely
primarily on a regulatory regime where the regulatory process is fair, unbiased,
98
comprehensive, and grounded in recent research and high-quality expert reports.
agency
of
by
way
However, if there are faults in the regulatory process-whether
inefficiency, industry capture, or failure to take into account changes in evidence
over time-a complementary tort regime may be necessary to remedy these
informational failures.
In light of PPACA's proposed system of oversight, the inherent
characteristics of decision-support tools, and existing regulations in the context of
health and medicine, it is likely that the development of regulations associated
with patient decision aids will proceed with the goal of ensuring accurate and
unbiased information, but may fall short if political or industry influences
intervene.
PPACA's proposed system of oversight for decision-support tools relies
9
on a team of qualified experts to evaluate and certify these tools.1 As written, the
law seems promising; an interdisciplinary team of experts is more likely to be
impartial and unbiased when evaluating decision-support tools. Moreover, because

Hylton, supra note 21, at 213-17.
194.
Rabin, supra note 21, at 2077. Public criticism of the FDA's ineffectiveness
195.
in protecting consumers through post-market surveillance may be one reason that the
Supreme Court has interpreted the FDCA to permit state law tort claims against
pharmaceutical manufacturers. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).
Elizabeth A. Weeks, Beyond Compensation: Using Torts to Promote Public
196.
Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 27, 55 (2007) ("[T]he [tort] process may identify
risks and seek corrective action more quickly than entrenched political or administrative
structures."). But see Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH.
L. REv. 285, 312-13 (2008) (noting that the review process proposed by the authors to
alleviate anti-innovation bias of the tort system may take months to complete).
See Rabin, supra note 21, at 2068-69; Weeks, supra note 196, at 31. Classic
197.
examples of this phenomenon include the nationwide tobacco litigation of the late twentieth
century, and the recent torts suits brought against the Catholic Church for its failure to act
on evidence of child sexual abuse by clergy.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b) (1998)
198.
(establishing that regulatory compliance may be a successful defense in a tort action if the
regulation is recent and subject to full deliberation); see also Rabin, supra note 21, at 2051,
2068.
199.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3506,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(c)(2)(A) (2012)).
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the law is new and will be implemented over the next few years, those involved in
the regulatory process will be able to take advantage of the latest evidence and so
maintain the highest standards of information-gathering.
However, despite the appeal of this proposal, it is possible that the
regulatory decision-making process may nevertheless be biased. The
characteristics of decision aids highlighted in Part 11-namely, their development
by third parties with possible conflicts of interest, their incorporation of valuebased judgments, and their application in controversial contexts where there is no
medically preferred course of care-suggest a significant possibility of bias or
industry capture. 200 For example, consider the written materials many states
provide about abortion risks. These materials, although prepared by purportedly
neutral state agencies acting on best evidence, have been widely criticized as
misleading, biased, and factually inaccurate. 20 1
Looking to approaches the United States has taken in other areas of health
and medicine may be instructive as well. There is no question that laws in this
sphere often develop against a backdrop of tension and negotiation between
interested parties-negotiation that has often been criticized as detrimental to the
American public. From its earliest days, the American medical profession has
actively pressured policy-makers to refrain from interference in the provision of
medical practice. Such professional lobbying is, according to many scholars, the
single most important factor slowing positive changes in the delivery and
financing of American healthcare-from the creation and development of the
health insurance industry to the passage of laws increasing access to care
(Medicare, Medicaid, and PPACA).202 The pharmaceutical and medical device
industry's lobbying efforts have unquestionably influenced the development of
FDA policy-again, often to the detriment of American consumers. Political
pressures by specialists and patient groups have delayed policy changes in areas
such as mammography and PSA screening, where new evidence has called into
question existing medical practices.203 In controversial areas such as end-of-life204
and reproductive care, 205 political and religious influences may trump evidencebased recommendations. 206 This process of policy negotiation between conflicted
parties is certainly not limited to the sphere of healthcare. However, the frequency
with which scientific evidence relevant to policy-making is dismissed because of
200.
See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 21, at 213-14 (noting that "political distortion"
is less likely under a court regime).
See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
201.
See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
202.
MEDICINE 235-334 (1982); Jill Quadagno, Why the United States Has No Health Insurance:
Stakeholder Mobilization Against the Welfare State, 1945-1996, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAv. 25 (2004).
203.
Harris, supra note 81.

204.

Rutenberg & Calmes, supra note 106.

Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Overruled on Availability of After-Sex Pill, N.Y.
205.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at Al.
206.
For example, a certifying entity might defer to political arguments that the

existence of a few discredited studies is indicative of legitimate scientific controversy.
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lobbyinj and political pressures appears to be particularly high in the healthcare
context. 7
In conclusion, while I have high hopes that regulators will be able to
achieve the goal of having a neutral certifying entity as contemplated by PPACA,
such neutrality cannot be assured. Concerns about industry capture will certainly
be relevant, given that the certifiers will be evaluating decision aids created by
insurers and other interested third parties. Political pressures may also affect how
certifiers deal with conflicting evidence, particularly with respect to controversial
or value-laden decisions. If these concerns about bias and conflicts of interest in
the regulatory regime are significant-as I believe they are-a purely
administrative approach to decision-support tools may be inadequate.
E. Proof and Causation
A final consideration in choosing between regulatory regimes is the
challenge of proof and causation. In order for a plaintiff to succeed in a tort suit, he
must demonstrate that the defendant's actions caused his injury. Accordingly, the
tort system may be ill-suited to situations where an injury arises from multiple
causes, or where causation cannot be proven. Consider, for example, a toxic tort
plaintiff who has developed cancer, allegedly as a result of workplace exposure to
toxins. In a tort suit against his employer, the plaintiff may cite epidemiological
studies showing that the prevalence of cancer in individuals who have been
exposed to this particular toxin is significantly higher than in non-exposed
individuals. While the epidemiological evidence may be unassailable, it simply
cannot prove as a matter of law that this particular exposure caused this particular
plaintiff's cancer; accordingly, such suits often fail.208 In cases such as these,
where there is inherent difficulty in drawing causal connections between a public

See Christopher J. Jewell & Lisa A. Bero, "Developing Good Taste in
207.
Evidence": Facilitatorsof and Hindrances to Evidence-Informed Health Policymaking in
State Government, 86 MILBANK Q. 177, 178 (2008) ("The role of evidence based on
research [in healthcare policy-making] is often minimal, and even when it is used by
policymakers, such evidence is greatly affected by cognitive and institutional features of the
political process."); id at 186 ("[L]egislators 'can be pretty close [sic] minded about
evidence'. . . ."); Linda Rosenstock & Lore Jackson Lee, Attacks on Science: The Risks to
Evidence-Based Policy, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 14, 15 (2002) (describing the 1996

withdrawal of all funding from the Department of Health and Human Services' Agency for
Health Care Quality and Research in response to its unpopular evidence-based
recommendations for managing back problems).
208.

See, e.g., Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F.

Supp. 2d 942, 983 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (plaintiff experts failed to use proper scientific method
to show that exposure to milk toxin caused laryngeal caner); Henricksen v. Conoco Phillips
Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d. 1142, 1161-63 (E.D. Wash 2009) (court barred testimony of
plaintiff's epidemiology expert, deeming it "unreliable" on issue of whether plaintiffs
laryngeal cancer was directly caused by benzene exposure).
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risk and a private plaintiff s injury, a regulatory approach is the more efficient way
of balancing risks.209
In contrast, a patient wishing to bring a tort suit against the publisher of a
faulty decision aid is likely to face only those problems of proof faced by any
plaintiff in a traditional informed consent or misrepresentation action. An injured
patient would need to show that the publisher was at fault in publishing the
decision aid, and that, had the decision aid not been faulty, the reasonable patient
would have chosen a different treatment option that would not have caused injury.
Unfortunately, as noted in Part II.C, this may be particularly difficult in the case of
decision-support tools, which are meant to be used precisely in those situations
where reasonable patients could reach differing decisions. Given how challenging
it may be for patients harmed by faulty decision aids to prove the causal element of
their claims, additional consideration may be required before concluding that tort
law is an appropriate mechanism for recovery.
Notably, however, the issue of proof and causation is the only factor
among the five identified herein that weighs more strongly in the direction of a
purely regulatory remedy. In contrast, the other four all suggest that administrative
regulations such as those proposed in PPACA may not be sufficient to protect
consumers. Given the likelihood of fault or bias in the creation and use of patient
decision aids, 210 the probability of individualized patient harms is high. As noted in
Part IV.B, these harms are not inevitable consequences of an inherently dangerous
practice, but rather are the type of "private harms" policy-makers consider
appropriate for compensation. Because regulatory approaches of the type proposed
by PPACA do not provide a remedy for such harms, a complementary tort remedy
will be needed-both to restore injured patients to their positions before relying on
faulty decision aids, and to incentivize decision-aid creators to ensure the quality
of their products. Moreover, while the regulations proposed by PPACA are
expected to directly address the possibility of harms arising from bias or
misrepresentation within patient decision aids, it is unlikely that they will set forth
mandatory standards for industry conduct that establish a "ceiling" rather than a
floor. If the proposed regulations merely set forth minimal or voluntary standards
of care, they will not be sufficient to protect consumers. Finally, one of the most
promising elements of the proposed regulation is its reliance on a team of qualified
experts to evaluate and certify decision aids; indeed, if this approach works as
anticipated, one might have greater confidence in the choice of a pure regulatory
regime over a complementary regime. Unfortunately, the prevalence of industry
lobbying and political pressures in the context of healthcare policy suggests that
this goal may not be realized.

209.
at 105.
210.

See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 146, at 561; Viscusi, supra note 21,
See supra Part II.
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V. COMPLEMENTING PROPOSED REGULATION WITH TORT
LIABILITY: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CHALLENGES
In light of the above analysis, what, if anything, can we conclude about
the optimal means of controlling the quality of patient decision aids?
First, given the unique characteristics of decision aids-namely, their
creation by parties outside the clinical sphere, their potential for patient reliance in
the absence of substantial physician oversight, and their application to value-laden
decisions-the likelihood of patient harm resulting from false or misleading
products is significant. Therefore, any system for controlling decision-aid quality
must incorporate some opportunity for recovery by those injured.
When viewed exclusively in terms of compensatory goals, the choice
between a regulatory regime and one that incorporates tort law remedies is a
difficult one. A comprehensive regulatory approach that establishes no-fault
compensation for injuries caused by faulty decision aids would serve these goals,
but so would a well-crafted tort law regime. This leaves us in a bit of a conundrum,
however. If we are committed to compensating patients for harms suffered as a
result of faulty decision aids, we must either use a tort system that is ill-equipped
to deal with such claims or a no-fault compensation system that would need to be
built from the ground up, with limited financial guarantees, and subject to the
problems highlighted in Part IV.A.
In comparing the two options, I believe a stronger case can be made for
the tort law option, because a number of the other factors identified in Part IV
weigh in favor of a tort law remedy as opposed to a regulatory mechanism for
patient compensation. First, the nature of the injuries likely to be suffered is
private, rather than public, as distinguished in Part IV.B. Second, given the types
of value-laden situations in which many decision aids are used, there is significant
risk that any regulations ultimately drafted may be influenced by political
pressures rather than scientific principles. Finally, it is likely that any regulations
will be voluntary and will merely set a floor for decision-aid quality. Each of these
factors suggests that a purely regulatory approach may not be sufficient for patient
protection. Moreover, the practical challenges in implementing a no-fault
compensation system in a developing industry, highlighted in Part IV.A, are not to
be underestimated.
However, relying on a complementary tort system for ensuring decisionaid quality faces a significant challenge as well: existing tort law is not currently
well-structured to resolve such disputes. To succeed in a negligence claim against
the creator of a faulty decision aid, the injured patient would need to prove
causation under the "reasonable patient" standard, and, if bringing a negligent
misrepresentation claim, would also need to demonstrate privity with the
defendant-both of which, for the reasons outlined in Part III.C, may be difficult.
One way of addressing this challenge might be to abandon the idea of
targeting creators of faulty decision aids and instead consider pursuing claims
against healthcare providers who prescribe faulty decision aids to patients. Such a
move would eliminate privity challenges, leaving only the issue of causation as a
barrier to recovery. However, there are important policy reasons why physicians,
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in the absence of independent negligent conduct, ought not be held liable for the
negligence of third-party information providers over whom they have no
control.211 Physicians, while obviously expected to meet professional standards of
care when advising patients during the informed consent process, 212 cannot be
expected to have the expertise needed to evaluate the accuracy of all the
information presented in third-party decision aids on a variety of clinical issues.
Rather, creators of decision aids are in the best position to ensure the quality and
accuracy of their products.
The context of pharmaceutical advertising and labeling may provide a
helpful analogy. The "learned intermediary" doctrine establishes that physicians'
special knowledge of medical practice may, in some cases, relieve product
manufacturers and information providers (typically, pharmaceutical companies
that distribute package inserts) from liability. 213 However, case law does not clarify
whether a physician would face tort liability where the information provided by the
product manufacturer itself is faulty. Logically, however, it is difficult to imagine
that a physician who made a good-faith effort to review the drug company's
information before providing it to a patient would be liable if the underlying
information were faulty, but not obviously so. 214 The alternative, of course, would
be to burden physicians with a standard of care that requires them to double-check
pharmaceutical companies' claims against the latest published research before
prescribing drugs to patients. While physicians ought not abdicate their duty to
provide quality care simply because they are relying on third-party information, it
seems unreasonable to argue that physicians should bear liability where they have
relied in good faith on information provided by companies whose business it is to
provide patients with healthcare information.
A second alternative would be to return to the original idea of tort liability
for creators of faulty decision aids, which would necessitate substantial changes to
tort law to achieve this goal. Such a project, moreover, would have an impact far
beyond the world of medical decision aids, potentially affecting information
providers in a variety of contexts. This Part further examines the challenges
inherent in making such a change.
A. Privity
The first challenge in using tort law to recover for harms resulting from
faulty decision aids is that privity between litigants is traditionally required in
211.
Sawicki, supra note 25, at 9.
212.
Accordingly, a physician who relies on a decision aid as a replacement for,
rather than a supplement to, the informed consent conversation would certainly be subject to
independent liability. Id.
213.
See Rabin, supra note 21, at 2079 ("In off-label use cases, as in drug defect
litigation generally, the learned intermediary defense is applicable-that is, the
manufacturer is shielded from liability for failure to adequately warn users if it has supplied
a reasonable warning to the physician.").
214.
The Author's thorough review of case law related to the learned intermediary
doctrine failed to discover any cases directly dealing with the issue of physician liability for
faulty information provided by pharmaceutical companies.
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negligent misrepresentation cases. As noted in Part III.C, courts are reluctant to
find privity where a defendant circulates misinformation to the general public,
rather than targeting it to a particular individual or small group.
However, this challenge may not be as significant as it initially appears.
Twentieth-century tort law has shifted away from the privity requirement in many
contexts, sometimes eliminating it altogether. In products liability cases, for
example, plaintiffs are no longer required to demonstrate privity with the
defendant in order to recover.215 Moreover, privity is not required in cases where
the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation is intentional, 216 further suggesting
that the elimination of privity in negligent misrepresentation cases may not be an
unwelcome change. At the very least, a patient who is harmed as a result of
intentional misrepresentations by decision-aid creators would be able to pursue a
traditional negligence claim without demonstrating privity. 217
The existing privity requirement as applied to negligent misrepresentation
cases may not be appropriate in the context of patient decision aids. As a
preliminary matter, decision-aid creators market their products with the explicit
expectation and intent that medical consumers will rely on them when making
important medical decisions. Furthermore, there are reasons why medical
information, such as information incorporated in decision-support tools, might
justifiably be treated differently from investment information21 8 or self-help
books. 219 First, the direct consequence of relying on faulty medical information is
likely to be bodily injury, which the American legal system generally treats
differently from pecuniary losses. 220 Another point in support of treating medical
information differently is the fact that no privity is required for liability in
pharmaceutical advertising and labeling cases, despite the fact that the patient and
pharmaceutical manufacturer are separated by at least two intermediaries-the
prescribing physician and the pharmacist.
B. Causation
The second challenge plaintiffs are likely to face when bringing tort suits
the
creators of faulty decision aids-whether on the grounds of negligence
against
or negligent misrepresentation-is proving causation. 22' Because decision-support
tools are used primarily in the context of preference-sensitive care where patients
215.

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389 (1916) (finding a duty

"irrespective of contract"); see also supra note 130.
216.
See DoBBs, supra note 135, § 480, at 1370-71.
217.

See supra note 135.

First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 670 F. Supp. 115, 118,
218.
119 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327 (S.D.N.Y.
219.
2006).
220.
To cite just one example, the Uniform Commercial Code typically allows
consumers to waive their right to sue makers of defective goods, but holds that such waivers
are "prima facie unconscionable" if they waive the right to sue for personal injuries arising
from defective goods. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2012).
See supraPart ff.E.
221.
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are choosing between multiple reasonable options, it may be difficult for a patient
to prove causation under the traditional informed consent standard. Had the
disclosure not been faulty, a reasonable patient would not have been injured. As
noted in Part III.C, because preference-sensitive decisions are so dependent on
patient values, jurors may have trouble predicting what option the "reasonable
patient" would have chosen had she relied on a more accurate decision-support
tool.
At first glance, this problem may seem intractable. However, the shift
from an objective standard of causation to a subjective standard is perhaps not as
unlikely as it initially seems. A number of tort law scholars,222 most recently
Evelyn Tenenbaum, have argued that the objective "reasonable patient" standard
of causation is unfaithful to and inconsistent with the goals of informed consent
doctrine.223 Dan Dobbs has referred to the objective standard of causation as
"controversial" and "more or less unique to the medical informed consent
cases."224 He argues that this rule "imposes some additional and most unusual
obstacle" not required in any other type of negligence action.225 Both authors note
that the objective standard of causation is particularly problematic because it does
not take into account the patient's own values and preferences,226 which, as noted
in Part I, are of paramount importance in making the kinds of preference-sensitive
decisions for which decision-support tools are commonly used.227 While some
legislatures have attempted to remedy this problem by adding a subjective
component to the causation standard-for example, referring to the "reasonable

Some courts have taken this view as well. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606
222.
P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979) (holding that the reasonable man standard does not apply in the
context of causation for informed consent because applying an objective standard would
result in the "patient's right of self-determination [being] irrevocably lost").
223.
Tenenbaum, supra note 136; see also, DOBBS, supra note 135, § 250, at 657;
Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and
Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 418-28 (1974); Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy

Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 137, 160-64 (1977).
224.
DOBBS, supra note 135, § 250, at 657.
225.
Id.
226.
Id. ("The real effect of the rule is to limit the defendant's duty of disclosure
for the protection of patients who have the same feelings about the risks and advantages of
the [procedure] that the mainstream of reasonable people would have. The special concerns
of an individual get no protection under the rule and 'a patient's right of self-determination
is irrevocably lost."'); Tenenbaum, supra note 136 ("[W]here between 20 and 80 percent of
patients would choose to have [a] treatment knowing the risks and alternatives[,] there are
genuine choices to be made and reasonable people will differ in their decisions depending
on their values and personal preferences.").
227.
See Tenenbaum, supra note 136 (highlighting the various reasonable options
available to patients making treatment decisions in the context of early prostate cancer,

early breast cancer, disease prevention, and menopause).
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patient under similar circumstances"228 -courts have generally refused to apply
this language to patients' non-medical preferences.229
The substantial contemporary criticism of the objective standard of
causation may now gain purchase as both the public and the legal community
become more aware of how prevalent preference-sensitive decisions are. The fast
pace of scientific and technological development in modem medical practice
means that today's patients have the opportunity to choose between many more
treatment options than they used to. As Tenenbaum notes, this may be an optimal
time to reevaluate the "reasonable person" standard of causation; doing so would
bring informed consent law closer in line with its original intent. 230 If, indeed, tort
law is shifting away from the objective standard of causation in medical
information cases, the possibility of a tort remedy for patients harmed by faulty
decision aids may be greater than it initially appears.
C Broader Implications
If the problems of privity and causation are resolvable through reasonable
modifications to tort law, a final challenge remains. Were the standards for
negligent misrepresentation modified to eliminate the existing requirements of
privity and objective causation, the impact might extend far beyond the narrow
context of decision-support tools to information providers more generallyincluding authors of books, articles, and websites that provide factual information.
Many critics, this Author included, would be reluctant to make such a dramatic
move. Proposing substantial changes to a large body of law is rarely an appropriate
response to a single, context-specific problem, and it would be foolhardy to use the
case of medical decision aids as a basis for a large-scale shift in tort doctrine,
particularly one that would threaten millions of potential defendants who had
previously been insulated from liability. After all, it is partly in an attempt to
protect "those who wish to share thoughts and theories" that product liability law
excludes printed informational materials from its purview. 231 However, a shift
away from the traditional privity and objective causation requirements could be
accomplished in such a way that results in a far more limited expansion of liability,
addressing the concern highlighted above.
Consider the following: Completely eliminating the formal privity
requirement for negligent misrepresentation cases would indeed open up the
floodgates of litigation-any person or entity who presents faulty information
could be liable, regardless of how distanced they are from the injured plaintiff.
Rather than eliminating the privity requirement altogether, however, this issue
could be resolved in a more targeted manner by making one of two modifications
to (or reinterpretations of) the requirement.
228.

Id. (citing New Mexico, New York, and Maine statutes); see also Fain v.

Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1155 (Ala. 1985).
229.
Tenenbaum, supra note 136 (citing Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law
and the ForgottenDuty ofPhysicianInquiry, 31 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 569 (2000)).
230.
See generally id.
231.
Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1991).
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One option might be to allow negligent misrepresentation claims to
proceed in the absence of privity only where the defendant intends that his
informational product be used by consumers. Courts have traditionally found that
authors of printed materials aimed at the general public do not owe a duty of care
to their readers, even if they foresee reader reliance.232 Foreseeability, however, is
distinct from intent. An information provider who merely foresees reader reliance
might legitimately be treated differently from an information provider who intends
that his informational product be used by consumers (particularly in making
choices that might result in physical, rather than merely pecuniary injury). If courts
were to find privity between consumers and those information providers who
specifically intend that their materials be used by consumers, the expansion of
negligent misrepresentation claims would be far more limited than if we were to
abandon privity entirely. While some might object that the line between
foreseeability and intent is a difficult one to draw, courts have had hundreds of
years of practice distinguishing between intentional and negligent torts, and
between different degrees of criminal activity.233 To demonstrate intent in a
negligent misrepresentation case, for example, a plaintiff might introduce evidence
about the information provider's business practices, its public statements, its target
audience, and its reliance on profits from the informational materials in question.
In this manner, many private individuals (authors of personal websites, for
example) might be excluded from liability.234
A second option, and one that would limit the expansion of liability even
more significantly, would be to take a cue from traditional negligence cases based
on intentional misrepresentation. 235 As noted above, where a plaintiff suffers
physical injury as a result of a defendant's intentional misrepresentation, the
plaintiff need not demonstrate privity to recover. 236 Under existing law, that is, a
patient would be permitted to bring a traditional negligence suit against the creator
of a faulty decision aid if she is able to prove that the underlying flaw in the

See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
232.
Note that limiting liability to information providers who intend reader
233.
reliance (suggesting greater privity than those who merely foresee reader reliance) would
not transform a negligent misrepresentation claim to a negligence claim based on intentional
misrepresentation claim, as the provider's intent (or lack thereof) to furnish faulty
information would remain unchanged.
While potentially more controversial, another possibility might be to limit
234.
the expansion of privity only in contexts involving medical information. The field of health
law has developed in response to a growing recognition that healthcare is "different" or
"special," and that American law frequently deviates from precedent and norms in
healthcare contexts. Norman Daniels, Health Care Needs and DistributiveJustice, 10 P-IlL.
& PUB. AFF. 146, 146 (1981); Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law's Coherence Anxiety, 96

GEO. L.J. 625, 645-46 (2008) (a treating physician owes legally enforceable duties to his
patients, even in the absence of a written or oral contract setting outside the scope of the
agreement). Modifying the privity requirement in cases of negligent misrepresentation of
medical information might be consistent with this approach.
See supra Part III.C.
235.
236.

See supra Part III.C.
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example, where political or financial
decision aid was intentional237-for
motivations cause a decision-aid creator to take advantage of cognitive biases, to
selectively present information, or to misrepresent the current state of scientific
knowledge. The problem with this approach, however, is that injured plaintiffs are
likely to face tremendous difficulty in proving the element of intent. Absent
incriminating letters or memoranda (that say, for example, "Let's not include
figures from the Smith study, because it doesn't support our position"), a
defendant would likely be able to claim ignorance or human error as the source of
any faults in information. For example, an organization of radiologists that
recommends chemotherapy over surgical intervention in a decision aid is likely far
more familiar with the literature on the positive outcomes associated with
radiology. Merely neglecting to do additional research on the outcomes of surgery
in preparing a decision aid would not satisfy the standard of intentional
misrepresentation-at best, such conduct could be described as gross negligence or
willful ignorance. Thus, while relying on intent to form the basis of a traditional
negligence claim against decision-aid creators would certainly be effective in
controlling the truly "bad actors," it remains to be seen whether this will be enough
to protect consumers.
To address this concern, one might propose a compromise that would
eliminate the privity requirement for misrepresentation-related negligence only in
situations where the provision of faulty information could be described as
intentional, grossly negligent, or deliberately ignorant. Such a step would capture
those entities who provide faulty information as a result of financial, political, or
other conflicts of interest, while protecting most typical information providers
from liability.
With respect to the proposed modification to the causation requirement,
moreover, limitations are already built into this recommendation. Medical
informed consent suits are the only contexts in which plaintiffs are required to
demonstrate objective decision causation (that the reasonablepatient, if provided
with information about medical risk, would have chosen a different procedure) as
well as traditional injury causation (that this particularplaintiffactually suffered
injury as a result of the undisclosed risk). In other words, eliminating the objective
causation would, as a matter of definition, only affect claims of medical
misrepresentation and negligence, not negligence claims more broadly.
For a practical example of how such modifications might play out,
consider the case highlighted in this Article's Introduction. John's diagnosis of
prostate cancer is delayed in part because he opted not to be screened for PSA for
another five years after his initial PSA test. John might consider pursuing a tort
claim against APAE, the organization that authored and published "Prostate
Cancer and You." Under traditional tort principles of informed consent and
negligent misrepresentation, John would not be successful in his suit unless he
could demonstrate: (i) that APAE negligently misrepresented facts in its brochure;
The claim would nevertheless be grounded in negligence because, even if the
237.
information provider's presentation of faulty information was intentional, the causation of
physical harm was merely reasonably foreseeable. See supra Part III.C.
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(ii) that these facts were relevant to John's condition and that John justifiably
relied on them in deciding not to pursue ongoing screening for PSA; (iii) that, if
the facts presented by APAE had been accurate, a reasonable patient would have
chosen PSA screening; (iv) that choosing not to be screened for PSA was the
actual cause of John's delayed diagnosis; and (v) that there was a direct
relationship of privity between John and APAE.
Presumably, John would have little difficulty satisfying factors (ii) and
(iv). Factor (i), whether APAE acted negligently in publishing faulty medical
information, would be highly dependent on the facts of John's case, as it should
be. However, his case would be stymied by factors (iii) and (v). First, because PSA
screening is a decision that is based on the values and preferences of each patient
and may vary from person to person, it is unlikely that John will be able to satisfy
the objective causation standard. Secondly, it will likely be impossible for John to
demonstrate privity with APAE, an organization with which he has had no prior
connection before his receipt of its brochure. Thus, regardless of APAE's state of
mind when publishing "Prostate Cancer and You," John will be unable to recover.
In constrast, consider the privity and causation modifications described
above. As to factor (iii), replacing objective causation with subjective causation
would permit John to proceed with his claim despite the impossibility of proving
what a "reasonable patient" would have chosen in his situation; as noted above, for
preference-sensitive decisions, there is no such thing as a reasonable patient.
Moreover, factor (v), the privity requirement, would be modified in one of two
ways. As one option, we might require that John instead demonstrate that APAE
intended, rather than merely foresaw, that consumers rely on and make medical
decisions on the basis of its publications. As a second option, we might do away
with factor (v) altogether and instead modify factor (i) to require a showing that
APAE's presentation of faulty information was grossly negligent or willfully
ignorant. Either option would put the focus on the facts of John's unique
circumstances, and particularly on the motivations and conduct of APAE.
Allowing creators of faulty decision aids to be liable in tort for the harms
caused by their products would surely be a significant burden and imposition on
the industry. However, if liability is dependent on the decision-aid creator's intent
with respect to public use of its informational product, or takes into account the
degree of its misconduct beyond mere negligence, concerns about dramatic
expansions of liability are buffered. Organizations that create decision aids in good
faith and based on solid and unbiased evidence, for example, would have little to
fear if regulation of decision aids were complemented by a system of tort liability
in this manner. As demonstrated above, it is possible to modify the privity and
causation requirements for cases of misrepresentation-related negligence by
decision-aid creators without having as dramatic an impact on information
provider liability as initially suggested. The elimination of objective decision
causation would only affect claims relating to medical information; the
modification of privity to embrace only information providers who intend that
consumers rely on their information, or whose conduct rises above traditional
negligence, would limit the number of affected claims even further. While these
changes will surely have an impact beyond the narrow context of patient decision
aids, they will not result in widespread changes to the application of tort law.
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CONCLUSION
The legal landscape surrounding decision-support tools is wide open.
These tools are currently unregulated, and although PPACA contemplates a
certification system that may serve a regulatory function, it will likely be years
before this system is implemented. Moreover, contemporary tort law does not
effectively recognize claims by injured patients against the creators of faulty
decision aids. Given this backdrop, now is the time for policy-makers to evaluate
the best mechanisms for ensuring decision-aid quality.
Viewing decision-aid quality within the context of the debate between
purely administrative and complementary tort law approaches to consumer
protection is an optimal way to do this. Analyzing the five factors policy-makers
typically use to make decisions between regulatory and tort law approaches seems
to suggest the adoption of both administrative regulations similar to those
proposed by PPACA and a tort law complement for ensuring decision-aid quality.
Although tort doctrine would need to incorporate two significant changes
to enable injured patients to bring negligence suits against creators of faulty
decision aids, both changes seem feasible, whether by way of legislation or
common law development. First, modifying the privity requirement in cases of
faulty decision aids would be consistent with tort law's contemporary shift towards
abandoning privity in many other contexts, including medical contexts like
pharmaceutical labeling. Ideally, the privity modification could be done in a
limited fashion, allowing patients to bring negligence misrepresentation claims
only against those who intend (rather than foresee) consumer reliance on their
informational products or whose misrepresentation is intentional, grossly
negligent, or deliberately ignorant, even in the absence of privity. Second,
modifying the causation requirement to permit suits by patients who are injured by
misinformation when making preference-sensitive decisions would be an effective
way of adapting informed consent law to a changing medical environment.
Although the use of patient decision aids offers substantial benefits over
the current system of informed consent, these aids (like any provision of medical
information) pose a significant possibility of harms. Accordingly, policy-makers
ought to consider these changes to misrepresentation-related claims of negligence
when evaluating mechanisms for ensuring consumer safety in this developing
industry.
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